The Continued Viability of the Act of State Doctrine in Foreign Branch Bank Expropriation Cases by Filzer, Paul N.
American University International Law Review
Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 3
1988
The Continued Viability of the Act of State
Doctrine in Foreign Branch Bank Expropriation
Cases
Paul N. Filzer
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Filzer, Paul N. "The Continued Viability of the Act of State Doctrine in Foreign Branch Bank Expropriation Cases." American
University International Law Review 3, no. 1 (1988): 99-143.
THE CONTINUED VIABILITY OF THE ACT OF STATE




The social and political revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries frequently involved the expropriation1 of property of United
States citizens.2 These expropriations ultimately produced extensive lit-
igation in United States courts.3 The act of state doctrine' often pre-
cludes United States courts from adjudicating these cases solely on the
* J.D. Candidate, 1988, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 470, 522 (5th ed. 1979) (defining expropriation
as the taking of private property by the state); see also infra notes 205-17 (discussing
the legal issues concerning expropriations).
2. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401-06 (1964)
(concerning the seizure of sugar following the Cuban revolution of 1959); Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 299-301 (1918) (involving the seizure of animal
hides during the Mexican revolution of 1913); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 857 (2d Cir. 1981) (regarding the expropriation of the
assets and liabilities of a United States bank following the fall of South Vietnam in
1975), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Day-Gormley Leather Co. v. National City
Bank, 8 F. Supp. 503, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (concerning the seizure of bank deposits
following the Russian revolution of 1917).
3. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401-06 (1964) (con-
cerning claims to a shipload of sugar expropriated after the Cuban revolution in 1959);
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 300-01 (1918) (involving rights to animal
hides seized during the Mexican revolution of 1913); American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 352 (1909) (regarding title to lands expropriated after the
succession of Panama from the United States of Colombia in 1903); Vishipco Line v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 857 (2d Cir. 1981) (concerning claims
for repayment of bank deposits expropriated immediately after the fall of Saigon to
communist forces in 1975), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Bernstein v. N.V.
Nederlandische-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375, 375-76 (2d
Cir. 1954) (involving a dispute over title to ships seized during the reign of National
Socialism in Germany between 1933 and 1945).
4. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). Chief Justice Fuller, speak-
ing for a unanimous court, said:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sover-
eign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another, done within its own territory. Redress of grievances
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of
by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Id.; see also infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (discussing the origins and devel-
opment of the act of state doctrine).
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merits of the litigants' legal claims.5 Although the cases in which
United States courts formulated the traditional act of state doctrine
involved the expropriation of tangible property," more recent act of
state cases7 involve the expropriation of intangible property, namely,
deposits8 held in foreign branches9 of United States banks. 10
In foreign branch bank expropriation cases, a United States bank,
presented with depositor demands for repayment of expropriated depos-
its, invokes the act of state doctrine to prevent a court from adjudicat-
5. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 398 (1964) (holding
that the act of state doctrine proscribes United States courts from maintaining an ac-
tion challenging the validity of a Cuban expropriation decree); Callejo v. Bancomer,
S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1116 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the act of state doctrine pre-
cludes civil actions challenging the validity of Mexican exchange control regulations);
see infra notes 61-94 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the act of
state doctrine in United States courts).
6. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 398 (1964) (involving
the expropriation of sugar loaded aboard a container ship anchored in Havana harbor);
Ricaud v. American Metal Co., Ltd., 246 U.S. 304, 305 (1918) (involving the Mexican
provisional government's seizure of lead bullion).
7. E.g., Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984);
Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Mich.
1985); Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 463 N.E.2d 5, 474
N.Y.S.2d 689, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984).
8. See 12 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(i) (1987) (defining the concept of deposit). The
Code of Federal Regulations defines a deposit as
[T]he unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a depository
institution in the usual course of business and for which it has given, or is obli-
gated to give credit . . . to an account . . . which is evidenced by an instrument
on which the depository institution is primarily liable.
Id. A deposit of money is a loan to the bank in which it is deposited. Miller, Debt Situs
and the Act of State Doctrine: A Proposal for a More Flexible Standard, 49 ALB. L.
REV. 647, 647 n.1 (1985). A deposit establishes a debtor-creditor relationship between
a bank and its depositors. 1 W. SCHLICHTING, T. RICE & J. COOPER, BANKING LAW §
9.02(1) (1987) [hereinafter 1 W. SCHLICHTING]. A bank becomes indebted to its de-
positor for the amount of the deposit accepted. Id. The statement of the bank portrays
this indebtedness as a liability. E. SYMoN s & J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 188 (1985).
This Comment uses the terms "liability" and "obligations" interchangeably to refer to
the debt a bank owes a depositor.
9. See 12 C.F.R. § 211.2(h) (1987) (defining a foreign branch as "an office of an
organization other than a representative office that is located outside the country under
the laws of which the organization is established, at which a banking or financing busi-
ness is conducted"); see also infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text (discussing the
operations of the foreign branches of the United States banks).
10. See 12 U.S.C. § 21 (1982) (defining a United States bank as any institution
authorized to engage in the business of banking). The United States Code limits the
business of banking to discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of
exchange, and other evidences of debt; receiving deposits; buying and selling exchange,
coin, and bullion; loaning money on personal security; and obtaining, issuing and circu-
lating bank notes. 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1982). But cf. 1 W. SCHLICHTING, supra note 8,
§ 1.02(3) (noting that a universally applicable definition of a bank is not possible).
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ing its refusal to honor the demands for repayment."' The bank argues
that because the expropriation is an act of a foreign government per-
formed within its own territory, United States courts cannot judge the
validity or propriety of the governmental action. 2 A court must refrain
from evaluating the validity of the expropriation. 3 Banks, therefore,
argue that courts must view the state expropriation of the deposit as a
collection of the debt owed the depositor.14 Because the deposit creates
a single debt between the bank and its depositor,' the collection by
expropriation relieves the bank of any liability to make a second pay-
ment on the debt.1 6 The act of state doctrine, therefore, is an essential
component of a United States bank's defense against claims for repay-
ment of expropriated deposits.
When a United States bank asserts this act of state defense, it as-
sumes that the expropriation is a governmental act performed within
the territory of the acting nation. 7 In situations involving intangible
property, however, this assumption is not always valid. Frequently, the
expropriated property is outside the territory of the expropriated nation
at the time of the expropriation. 8 Determining the availability of the
11. Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 650-51 (2d Cir. 1984);
Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526, 1536
(E.D. Mich. 1985); Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 463-66,
463 N.E.2d 5, 8-11, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 692-95, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984).
12. See Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 466, 463 N.E.2d
5, 11, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 695 (accepting the argument of the bank that a confiscation
is an act of a foreign sovereign within its own territory and is not reviewable in a
United States court), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984).
13. See Ricaud v. American Metal Co., Ltd., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918) (explaining
the deference a United States court must afford an action of a foreign sovereign taken
within the foreign territory); see also Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303
(1918) (same); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357-58
(1909) (same); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 253, (1897) (same).
14. See Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 466, 463 N.E.2d
5, 11, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 695 (holding that the Cuban expropriation of the plaintiff's
certificates of deposit was equivalent to payment of the full amount of the certificates),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984).
15. See 1 W. SCHLICHTING, supra note 8, § 9.02(1) (explaining the nature of the
debtor-creditor relationship arising from a bank deposit).
16. Id.; see Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 652 (2d Cir.
1984) (Kearse, J., dissenting) (stating that after a debt is collected pursuant to a valid
decree, the debt is extinguished).
17. Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 650 (2d Cir. 1984);
Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526, 1536
(E.D. Mich. 1985); Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 464, 463
N.E.2d 5, 9, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 693, cerl. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984).
18. See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir.
1981) (holding that at the time of the expropriation decrees, the situs of the deposits
was no longer Vietnam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Trinh v. Citibank, N.A.,
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act of state defense requires consideration of the situs19 of the expropri-
ated deposits at the time of expropriation. If the situs of the deposit, at
the time of the expropriation, is the expropriating nation, the act of
state doctrine provides a United States bank with a defense against
depositor demands for repayment of expropriated deposits.2 0 Situs de-
termination, therefore, is a critical component of foreign branch bank
expropriation cases.21
There are three problems with the application of the current situs
determination tests in foreign branch bank expropriation cases. Ini-
tially, each of the current situs determination tests are fundamentally
inconsistent with the constitutional underpinnings of the act of state
doctrine. Second, the federal circuit courts are split over the appropri-
ate situs determination test. Finally, the current situs determination
tests raise the possibilities of gross inequities in foreign branch bank
expropriation cases.
Parts I and II of this Comment, respectively, discuss the interna-
tional activities of United States banks and the development of the act
of state doctrine. Part III discusses the shortcomings of the act of state
doctrine in foreign branch bank expropriation cases. Part IV of this
Comment evaluates recent legislative attempts to alter the traditional
act of state doctrine. Finally, Part V presents two proposals designed to
bring predictability and fairness to foreign branch bank expropriation
cases.
I. INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF UNITED STATES
BANKS
The decades after World War II witnessed the explosive growth of
the multinational corporation.2 United States corporations led the
world trend toward business multinationalism. 23 As their corporate cli-
ents expanded their operations overseas, many large United States
banks established international banking networks to serve the needs of
623 F. Supp. 1526, 1536 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (ruling that at the time of the confiscation
decrees, the situs of the deposits was not Vietnam).
19. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1244 (defining the situs of
property as the specific location of the property).
20. Note, Act of State: The Fundamental Inquiry of Situs Determination for Ex-
propriated Intangible Property: Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 121, 124 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Fundamental Inquiry].
21. Id.
22. Glynn, Multinationals in the World of Nations, in THE MULTINATIONAL EN-
TERPRISE IN TRANSITION 60, 63 (P. Grob, F. Ghadar & D. Khambata 2d ed. 1984).
23. Jacoby, The Multinational Corporation, in THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
IN TRANSITION, supra note 22, at 3, 7.
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their multinational clients. 24 This practice, coupled with the increas-
ingly interdependent nature of the international monetary system, re-
sulted in United States banks becoming leaders in international
banking.2 5
As of the end of 1984, United States banks concentrated foreign op-
erations in Western Europe 6 and the industrialized countries of the
Pacific Basin.27 To date, United States banks generally have been re-
luctant to expand their operations into developing countries. 8 The risks
of political instability, and capricious government regulations or manip-
ulations, inhibit United States banks from expanding into many devel-
oping nations.29 Because United States banks are experiencing greater
competition,3" both at home and abroad, from Japanese,31 British,32
French,33 and West German 3 banks, they must expand their interna-
tional banking networks into countries that they have avoided in the
past. 5
24. E. RoUSSAKIS, INTERNATIONAL BANKING: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 10-II
(1983); P. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL BANKING 13 (1970).
25. See Am. Banker, Oct. 24, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (showing that in 1984, United
States banks operated 2,246 foreign offices in over 100 countries). The total foreign
assets of United States banks was $322.5 billion in 1984. Id.
26. Id. Approximately 33% of the foreign offices of United States banks are in the
Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, Belgium, and Spain. Id.
27. Id. Approximately 15% of the foreign offices of United States banks are lo-
cated in either Hong Kong, Australia, and Japan. Id.
28. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN GOVERN-
MENT TREATMENT OF UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL BANKING ORGANIZATIONS 639
(1979) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT]. Large United States banks, however, have
shown a willingness to establish a limited presence in some less developed countries. Id.
29. Id. On the whole, developing countries impose harsher and more discriminatory
restrictions than other nations. Id.
30. See V. MURO, WORLD BANKING HANDBOOK 20-23 (1984) (presenting a list of
the largest international banks in the world).
31. See id. at 20 (illustrating through a series of tables that 5 of the 15 largest
internationally active banks, based on total assets and number of foreign offices, are
Japanese).
32. See id. at 23 (illustrating through a series of tables that 3 of the top 15 banks,
based on total assets and number of foreign offices, in the world are British).
33. See id. at 21 (illustrating through a series of tables that three of the world's
largest banks, based on total assets and number of foreign offices, are French).
34. See id. at 22 (illustrating through a series of tables that one of the most active
international banks in the world, based on total assets and number of foreign offices, is
a West German bank).
35. Comment, Foreign Branches of U.S. Banks - A Proposal for Partial Suspen-
sion During Periods of Unrest, 7 FORDHAM L. REV. 118, 119 (1983-1984) [hereinafter
Comment, Foreign Branches]; see Am. Banker, July 28, 1983, at 10, col. I (summariz-
ing United States bank activities in developing countries). Developing countries have
started offering significant rates of return on investments, taxation incentives, and regu-
latory incentives to attract the capital, technology, and expertise necessary for indus-
trial development. Note, The Harvest of Sabbatino: Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan
1988]
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A United States bank can expand its international banking network
in numerous ways. First, a United States bank can become internation-
ally active without leaving the United States. For example, a United
States bank can engage in international banking without establishing
overseas facilities by creating an international department in its head
office, 36 incorporating an Edge Act corporation, 37 establishing interna-
tional banking facilities (IBFs),38 or operating an export trading com-
pany.39 Second, a United States bank can expand its international net-
work by establishing overseas facilities. Overseas facilities available to
Bank, 8 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 87, 87 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Harvest of
Sabbatino]. United States banks that operate developed international banking networks
now view the advantages of operating in developing countries as outweighing the risks
of political instability created by economic and cultural upheaval.
Advantages that banks have experienced include increasing their competitiveness, ex-
ploiting incentives offered by the country to attract investment, and establishing them-
selves in a market that has great future growth potential. TREASURY REPORT, supra
note 28, at 135-36. Compare Am. Banker, Oct. 24, 1984, at 1, col. I (detailing the
foreign activities of United States banks) with Countries in Trouble, EcONOMIST, Dec.
20, 1986, at 69, 70 (indicating which countries are most likely to experience instability
during the remainder of the decade). This comparison shows that United States banks
have 195 offices in the countries most likely to experience political, social, or economic
instability during the remainder of the decade. Id. It appears that the risks of political
instability no longer deter United States banks from expanding into developing coun-
tries. As United States banks continue expansion into politically unstable countries the
risks of foreign branch expropriations increase. See supra note 29 and accompanying
text (explaining the tendency of developing countries to interfere arbitrarily with
United States banking interests). To facilitate the overseas expansion of United States
banks, it is necessary to eliminate the flaws inherent in the act of state doctrine in
foreign branch bank expropriation cases. See infra notes 181-84 (explaining the flaws
in applying the doctrine to foreign branch bank expropriations). The prospect of addi-
tional foreign branch bank expropriations makes an analysis of the application of the
act of state doctrine in foreign branch bank expropriation cases an important issue for
United States banks.
36. See P. OPPENHEIM, supra note 24, at 14-15 (describing the role of the interna-
tional department of a United States bank).
37. 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-611a (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 211.4 (1987). An Edge Act corpo-
ration is a wholly owned subsidiary of a United States bank, established to engage in
activities that are incidental to international business. J. BAKER, INTERNATIONAL BANK
REGULATIONS 38 (1979). Edge Act corporations may not conduct domestic banking in
the United States. P. OPPENHEIM, supra note 24, at 14.
38. International Banking Facility Deposit Act of 1981, § 102, 12 U.S.C. §
1813(l)(5)(B) (1982). IBFs allow a United States bank to take deposits from foreign-
ers and make loans to support the foreign operations of their clients at any domestic
office. E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra note 8, at 749. The deposits of an IBF are not
subject to the reserve requirements the United States imposes on other deposits held
within the United States. 12 C.F.R. § 204.8 (1987). Additionally, the deposits of an
IBF are exempt from the interest rate limits imposed on deposits held within the
United States. 12 C.F.R. § 217.6(a) (1987). IBFs may not conduct business with
United States residents. E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra note 8, at 749.
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14)(F)(i) (1982). An export trading company provides
foreign exchange and financing services to facilitate exports of United States goods or
services. Id. § 1843(c)(14)(F)(ii).
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United States banks include representative offices, 0 bank consortia,41
foreign branches,42 foreign subsidiaries,43 and foreign affiliates."
The foreign branch' 5 is the most common form of overseas facility.
40
To establish a foreign branch, the United States bank must obtain per-
mission from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System'7
40. See E. ROUSSAKIS, supra note 24, at 16 (defining the establishment of a repre-
sentative office as an interim step in the creation of a branch office). A representative
office provides its clients with information on businesses in the host country, or the
political or economic climate of the host country. Id. A representative office cannot
provide its clients with the full range of banking services, such as deposit taking or
extending credit. Id.
41. See id. at 25 (describing a bank consortia as a joint venture among banks of
varying nationalities establishing a separate bank, known as the consortium bank, in
the host country).
42. See infra note 45 (defining a foreign branch of a United States bank).
43. 12 C.F.R. § 211.2 (1987) (defining a subsidiary as an organization in which an
investor, directly or indirectly, holds more than 50% of the voting securities).
44. 12 C.F.R. § 211.2(a) (1987) (defining an affiliate of an organization as any
entity of which the organization is a direct or indirect subsidiary, or any direct or
indirect subsidiary of the organization); see S. KHOURY, DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL
BANKING 77 (1980) (defining an affiliate as an organization in which an investor con-
trols less than 50% of the voting securities).
45. 12 C.F.R. § 211.2(h) (1987) (defining a foreign branch as an office of an insti-
tution located outside the country under the laws of which the institution is organized).
46. Comment, Foreign Branches, supra note 35, at 119. Most banks prefer
branches because they are flexible and cost efficient. TREASURY REPORT, supra note
28, at 269. Foreign branches allow the parent to raise funds abroad when United
States regulations increase the costs of acquiring funds within the United States. E.
ROUSSAKIS, supra note 24, at 9-13. The parent bank can manipulate the borrowing and
lending policies of its branches so as to provide major domestic corporate clients with
inexpensive funds. Id. at 30-33; E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra note 8, at 750-52.
Additionally, foreign branches allow the parent bank to exercise direct control over
foreign operations. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 28, at 299. Citibank uses a matrix
organization to control its international banking network. U.N. CENTRE ON TRANS-
NAT'L CORPS., TRANSNATIONAL BANKS: OPERATIONS, STRATEGIES AND THEIR EFFEcTS
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 63 (1981) [hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL BANKS]. In a ma-
trix organization, a foreign branch manager is accountable to a superior in charge of a
particular type of transaction as well as to a superior in charge of the operations in the
particular country. Id. at 63 n.19. Generally, these superiors reside in the home country
of the bank. Id.
47. 12 U.S.C. § 601 (1982). Congress established the federal reserve system in
1913. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 1, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 221 (1982)). The Federal Reserve System is a network of twelve central
banks to which most national banks belong and most state banks may belong. E. SY-
MONS & J. WHITE, supra note 8, at 27. The preamble to the original Act stated that
the purpose of the Federal Reserve Act was to "furnish an elastic currency to afford
means of rediscounting commercial paper [and] to establish a more effective supervi-
sion of banking in the United States." Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 1, 38 Stat. 251
(1913), preamble.
The Board of Governors consists of seven members, appointed by the President and
approved by Congress, who serve 14-year terms. Federal Reserve Act, § 10, 12 U.S.C.
§ 241 (1982). The Board of Governors establishes reserve requirements for member
banks, reviews and approves the discount rate actions of regional federal reserve banks,
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and comply with the applicable laws of the foreign country. 8 When the
United States bank establishes a foreign branch, the laws and regula-
tions of both the United States4 9 and the foreign country50 govern the
operations of the foreign branch.
Although court opinions differ concerning the precise nature of the
relationship between the parent bank and its foreign branches, courts
generally consider the foreign branch a separate and distinct business
entity.51 Because modern banking transactions are complex, deposits
and issues banking regulations. Id.
48. E. RoUSSAKIS, supra note 24, at 17.
49. 12 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1982) (authorizing the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System to regulate the powers that a foreign branch of a United States bank
may exercise). The foreign branches of United States banks may not "engage in the
general business of producing, distributing, buying or selling goods, wares, or merchan-
dise," nor may they "engage or participate, directly or indirectly, in the business of
underwriting, selling, or distributing securities." Id. Additionally, both the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Comptroller of the Currency reserve
the right to examine the books and records of foreign branches. See 12 U.S.C. § 325
(1982) (authorizing the Federal Reserve Board to examine the books and records of
the foreign branches of state banks); id. § 602 (authorizing the Comptroller of the
Currency to demand information concerning the foreign branches of a national bank).
The United States banking system is a bifurcated system. E. SYMONS & J. WHITE,
supra note 8, at 24-26. Currently, United States banks may receive either national
charters pursuant to the National Bank Act of 1864 or state charters pursuant to state
law. Id.
The United States, however, drafts its laws governing the overseas activities of
United States banks to place those banks in a strong competitive position overseas. Id.
at 745. Generally, Regulation Q, which places limits on the interest rate banks may
pay on deposits, does not apply to the foreign branches of United States banks. 12
C.F.R. § 217.3(a) (1987). Regulation D, which mandates the percentage of deposits a
bank must keep on hand to meet the depositor demands, is also inapplicable to the
foreign branches of United States banks. Id. § 204.1(c)(5). In addition, the Federal
Reserve Act excludes foreign branches of United States banks from paying FDIC con-
tributions for deposits payable outside the United States. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(1)(5)
(1982). When a domestic office explicitly guarantees the deposits of the foreign branch,
however, those deposits are subject to the interest rate limitations and reserve require-
ments imposed pursuant to Regulations Q and D, respectively. Heininger, Liability of
U.S. Banks for Deposits Placed in Their Foreign Branches, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 903, 905 n.3 (1979). Governmental regulation of the domestic activities of United
States banks indirectly costs United States citizens one billion dollars annually. M.
WEIDENBAUM, BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC 69 (2d ed. 1981). Free from
the costs these regulations impose, foreign branches are able to compete effectively in
other countries. Logan & Kantor, Deposits at Expropriated Foreign Branches of U.S.
Banks, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 333, 335.
50. FED. RESERVE BD., FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN 1123 (1918). Most foreign
countries, however, do not supervise or examine the activities of banks operating within
their territory as extensively as the United States. OFFiCE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, F.I.N.E. STUDY RESPONSES 134 (1976). Lesser developed nations have
neither the expertise nor the governmental infrastructure to supervise their banking
industry to the degree the United States does. Id.
51. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 1963); Pan-
American Bank & Trust Co. v. National City Bank, 6 F.2d 762, 767 (2d Cir. 1925),
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made at a branch office are payable on demand only at that branch."2
When a branch office closes voluntarily or wrongfully refuses a demand
for repayment, however, the parent bank is liable for the deposits of its
foreign branch.53 Thus, the liabilities as well as the assets of the branch
are ultimately the property of the parent bank.54
II. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
A. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT
The act of state doctrine is a complex doctrine of law.05 Uncertainty
exists regarding the actual nature of the doctrine, its underpinnings,
and its origins. 56 The act of state doctrine is a conflict of laws princi-
ple,57 not a rule of international law.58 The doctrine, however, is not
cert. denied, 269 U.S. 554 (1925); Clinton Trust Co. v. Compahiia Azucarera Central
Mabay, S.A., 172 Misc. 148, 151, 14 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Note, Har-
vest of Sabbatino, supra note 35, at 90-92; see 12 U.S.C. § 604a (1982) (stating that
every national banking association operating foreign branches must maintain a sepa-
rate ledger of losses and profits for each individual branch).
52. Sokoloff v. National City Bank of New York, 250 N.Y. 69, 81-82, 164 N.E.
745, 750 (1928); Murtaugh v. Yokohama Specie Bank Ltd., 149 Misc. 693, 694-95,
269 N.Y.S. 65, 67 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Bluebird Undergarment Corp. v. Gomez, 139
Misc. 742, 744-45, 249 N.Y.S. 319, 321 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Logan & Kantor, supra note
49, at 341; Heininger, supra note 49, at 934-44.
The rapid, complex nature of modern commercial and banking transactions necessi-
tates such a rule. See First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 622 (2d Cir. 1959)
(stating that the separate entity doctrine is a matter of commercial necessity), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960). A branch must have the authority to hire and train em-
ployees, negotiate with local labor unions, clear checks with local clearing house as-
sociations, provide for the maintenance of its facilities, and print forms in compliance
with local law. L. WEERAMANTRY & W. SCHLICHTING, BANKING LAw § 212.02
(1987).
53. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526,
1533 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Heininger, supra note 49, at 975; Comment, Foreign
Branches, supra note 35, at 126.
54. E. ROUSSAKIS, supra note 24, at 170; see TRANSNATIONAL BANKS, supra note
46, at 62-63 (detailing the control a parent bank exercises over its foreign branches). In
the absence of arms-length dealings between the branch and its parent, the parent
should be ultimately liable for the debts of its branch. First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS,
271 F.2d 616, 619 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
55. Wallace, Introductory Remarks, in ACT OF STATE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL
REACH 4 (J. Lacey ed. 1983).
56. Id.
57. Jimenez v. Aristequieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557 n.6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 914 (1962); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 855 (2d Cir.
1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 41 comment c (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1986); 45 AM. JUR. 2D Int'l Law § 83 (1969).
58. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 422 (1964) (stating
that no existing "international arbitral or judicial decision suggests that international
law prescribes recognition of sovereign acts of foreign governments"); J. STARK, IN-
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unique to United States jurisprudence. 59 A number of the largest trad-
ing nations in the world apply some variation of the act of state
doctrine.8 0
Supreme Court decisions in several cases involving disputed acts of
foreign sovereigns have formulated the act of state doctrine.6 The doc-
trine precludes United States courts from sitting in judgment of the
acts of a foreign government performed within its own territory.
0 2
TRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 124-25 (1977) (stating that the act of state doc-
trine is not a principle of international law).
59. See Note, Act of State Doctrine - Limitations on Sabbatino: Non-Applicability
of the Hickenlooper Amendment, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 243, 244 n.9 (1968) (tracing
the act of state doctrine back to 1354 and the writings of Bartolus Tractatus Repracs-
salium). The doctrine became firmly entrenched in Anglo-American law as early as
1674 in the English case of Blad v. Bamfield. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964) (citing Blad v. Bamfield, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (1674)).
60. See Annotation, Act of State Doctrine, 12 A.L.R. FED. 707, 712-13 (1972)
(stating that the United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands each have a concept similar to the
United States act of state doctrine). But see Wallace, supra note 55, at 5 (stating that
while the courts of many countries apply a doctrine of law which they refer to as an act
of state doctrine, only the courts of the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada have
an act of state doctrine similar to the United States). British courts, however, will not
apply the act of state doctrine in cases involving violations of international law. A.M.
Luther v. James Sagor & Co., [1921] 1 KB 456. Because international law is part of
British law, the refusal of a British court to challenge the propriety of a violation of
international law is, in effect, sanctioning a violation of British law.
61. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Int'l Law § 83 (1969). The act of state doctrine first appears in
United States jurisprudence in Hudson v. Guestier. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino, 376 U.S. 398, 415 n.17 (1964) (citing Hudson v. Guestier, 9 U.S. (4 Cranch)
293, 293-94 (1808)). For a chronology of Supreme Court cases developing the act of
state doctrine, see generally L'Invincible, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 238, 253 (1816) (deter-
mining that the seizure of a private vessel is a sovereign act not reviewable in a United
States court); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (stating the tradi-
tional formulation of the act of state doctrine); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222-23
(1905) (introducing the traditional jurisdiction over the debtor test for situs determina-
tion); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918) (explaining for the
first time that the act of state doctrine was based on principles other than international
comity); United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 466 (1936)
(holding that decrees of a foreign government were worthy of extraterritorial effect
because they were consistent with United States law and public policy); Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 415 (1964) (stating that the act of state
doctrine is applicable even if the actions of the foreign government violate international
law). Decisions of the federal appellate courts have also contributed to the development
of the United States act of state doctrine. See generally Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764
F.2d 1 101, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1985) (introducing the incidents of the debt situs test);
Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 715-16 (5th
Cir.) (introducing the complete fruition test for situs determination), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 924 (1968).
62. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). Although Chief Justice
Fuller's formulation of the act of state doctrine appears unambiguous, certain terms
used in the statement require a definition. A "state" is a "society of men united to-
gether for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by combined
strength." Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454, 459 (1877); 45 AM. JUR. 2D Int'l Law § 13
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When the actions of a foreign government affect the subject matter of
litigation, "the details of the action or the merit of the result cannot be
questioned, but accepted as a rule for their decision." 0 3 The act of state
doctrine, therefore, is a threshold issue preclusion device that may deny
a United States court subject matter jurisdiction over claims involving
the propriety of the acts of a foreign sovereign."
In many expropriation cases the decrees or actions of the foreign
government are ambiguous. 5 United States courts, therefore, must fre-
quently interpret the meaning of the foreign decrees to determine the
precise nature and scope of the expropriation."6 While the act of state
doctrine precludes United States courts from considering the validity or
propriety of a foreign expropriation decree, it does not prevent United
(1969). States occupy a definite territory, are politically organized under one govern-
ment, and engage in foreign relations. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena,
293 F. Supp. 892, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 45 AMt. JUR. 2D Int'l Law § 13 (1969). A
typical state action for act of state purposes is the taking of private property by the
government. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 41 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986).
Generally, United States courts have employed the act of state doctrine to preclude
judicial consideration of the acts of a foreign government only if the political branches
of the United States have recognized that government as the de jure government of the
state. Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 130 Misc. 66, 224 N.Y.S. 102 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
aft'd, 250 N.Y. 69, 81, 145 N.E. 917, 918-19 (1928); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 42 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986). On
occasion, however, United States courts have held that although the United States po-
litical branches do not recognize a foreign government as the de jure government of a
foreign state, the government may nevertheless have a de facto existence which is jurid-
ically cognizable. See M. Salimoff v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679
(1933) (holding the Soviet government was the sovereign power within Russia). In such
cases, the act of state doctrine bars judicial consideration of challenges to the actions of
the government. Id.
63. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., Ltd., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918).
64. Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 1985); Arango v.
Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1380 (5th Cir. 1980); National Amer.
Corp. v. Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir.
1979).
65. See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 861-62 (2d
Cir. 1981) (holding that the decrees of the provisional government of Vietnam did not
unequivocally indicate whether the National Bank of Vietnam assumed the liabilities of
the banks whose assets the government had confiscated), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976
(1982); Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 713-14
(5th Cir.) (noting that the pronouncements of the Cuban government did not clearly
indicate the nationalization of the tobacco company in question), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
924 (1968).
66. See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 861-62 (2d
Cir. 1981) (ruling that the decrees of the provisional revolutionary government did not
encompass the liabilities of the banks whose assets had been confiscated), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 976 (1982); Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392
F.2d 706, 713-14 (2d Cir.) (holding that the Cuban government had not nationalized
the tobacco company in question), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
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States courts from determining the scope of those acts or decrees."7
The act of state doctrine only bars judicial consideration of foreign
actions committed within the territory of the foreign state.68 United
States courts will give effect to the acts of a foreign sovereign per-
formed outside its territory only when the acts are consistent with the
laws and public policy of the United States.69 The laws and public pol-
icy of the United States,70 however, are antithetical to the confiscation
of private property without prompt, adequate, and effective compensa-
tion.7 1 United States courts, thus, will not give effect to an uncompen-
67. Reavis v. Exxon Corp., 90 Misc. 2d 980, 987-88, 396 N.Y.S.2d 774, 779 (Sup.
Ct. 1977); see Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 861-62
(2d Cir. 1981) (stating that the Vietnamese decrees did not encompass the liabilities of
the expropriated branch bank), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982). After deciding that
the Vietnamese government did not assume the liabilities of the expropriated branch,
the court held that the act of state doctrine did not preclude judicial consideration of
claims involving those liabilities. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660
F.2d 854, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982). The court in Vi-
shipco ignores the fact that under communist ideology, commercial enterprises belong
to the state. Note, Harvest of Sabbatino, supra note 35, at 93. Given this principle of
communism, the court in Vishipco should have held that the government decrees ex-
tended to the branches' assets. Id.
68. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). The "territorial limitations
of the act of state doctrine embodies the considered judgment of the judicial branch
that a foreign state can be said to have reasonable expectations of dominion only with
respect to property located within its own boundaries." Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Na-
cional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see infra note 80 (dis-
cussing the relationship between the constitutional underpinnings of the act of state
doctrine and a foreign state's expectations of dominion).
69. Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966); Zwack v. Kraus Bros. & Co., 237 F.2d 255, 259
(2d Cir. 1956).
70. Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 270
F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Generally, United States laws and public policy
prohibit the uncompensated taking of private property by the state. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V (stating, "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation"). Even though the fifth amendment only prohibits the taking of private
property by the federal government, it is still symbolic of United States revulsion to the
uncompensated confiscation of private property. Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966). But see
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 231-33 (1942) (holding that upon recognition of
the Soviet government as the de jure government of Russia, the confiscation of private
property by the Soviet government became consistent with the laws of the United
States). Because the confiscation decrees were consistent with the laws .of the United
States, the court gave them extraterritorial effect. Id.
71. State Department Press Release No. 630, Dec. 30, 1975, reprinted in 15 I.L.M.
186 (1976); 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 266-67 (1967). The obligation of the expropriating government to pay
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation is based on the equitable principle of just
compensation. Id.; see also H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROBLEMS 479-80 (1986) (describing prompt, adequate, and effective compensation as
a general standard that lends to flexible application by expropriating states and courts).
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sated expropriation of property situated outside the territory of the for-
eign state at the time of the expropriation.7 2 Therefore, if an
expropriated bank deposit is located outside the expropriating state at
the time of the expropriation, the act of state doctrine does not pre-
clude a United States court from adjudicating claims challenging the
expropriation.7 3 Therefore, the legal determination of the situs of the
expropriated property at the time of the expropriation decree is a sig-
nificant stage in the resolution of foreign branch bank expropriation
cases.
"7 4
To determine the situs of property for act of state purposes United
States courts must consider the principles underlying the act of state
doctrine. Initially, the Supreme Court based the act of state doctrine
on the principle of comity among nations.75 Deferring to principles of
international comity, United States courts applied the doctrine to avoid
considering claims that would embarrass or offend another govern-
ment.7 6 As United States courts continued to apply the act of state
doctrine, the beliefs regarding its underpinnings began to change. 77
B. THREE JUDICIALLY CREATED ExCEPTIONS
The act of state doctrine, while not constitutionally mandated, has
constitutional underpinnings reflective of separation of powers princi-
72. See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 862-63 (2d
Cir. 1981) (holding that the deposits in question were located outside the territory of
Vietnam at the time of the expropriation decrees and, therefore, the act of state doc-
trine did not prevent United States courts from considering claims that required an
examination of the decrees), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
73. Id.
74. Note, Fundamental Inquiry, supra note 20, at 124.
75. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918) (stating the act of
state doctrine rests upon the highest considerations of international comity); American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 352 (1909) (holding that the principle
of comity of nations mandates the act of state doctrine). The Supreme Court defines
international comity as
[N]either a matter of absolute obligation on the one hand, nor a mere courtesy
and good will on the other. But it is a recognition which one nation allows within
its territory to the . . . acts of another, having due regard both to international
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons
who are under the protections of its laws.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1894).
76. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) (holding the act of state
doctrine bars judicial consideration of claims resulting from the Mexican provisional
government's seizure of cowhides). Judicial consideration of such claims would be an
affront to the Mexican government. Id.; see also Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246
U.S. 304 (1918) (holding that the act of state doctrine precludes judicial consideration
of claims arising from the Mexican provisional government's seizure of lead bullion).
77. See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (raising the possi-
bility that the doctrine rests, at least in part, on separation of powers principles).
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pies.78 The doctrine symbolizes judicial recognition of the preeminence
of the President to conduct foreign relations.79 Because the judicial
consideration of the acts of a foreign sovereign might frustrate the abil-
ity of the President to conduct foreign relations, United States courts
refrain from adjudicating the acts of foreign sovereigns.80 Despite the
constitutional underpinnings of the act of state doctrine, United States
courts habitually misapply the doctrine. 81 Additionally, not all United
States courts accept the validity of the doctrine. In the past three de-
cades, the judiciary has carved out at least three broad exceptions to
the act of state doctrine.
I. The Bernstein Exception
The Bernstein exception is the oldest judicially created exception to
78. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); see also
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976) (recognizing the
constitutional underpinings of the act of state doctrine); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 658 F.2d 875, 881-82 (2d Cir. 1981) (acknowledging
the separation of powers principle underlying the act of state doctrine).
79. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976); Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426-27, 431-33 (1964); Garcia v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 651 (2d Cir. 1984); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 658 F.2d 875, 881-82 (2d Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 180 (2d Cir. 1967).
80. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976); Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431-33 (1964); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 658 F.2d 875, 882 (2d Cir. 1981). A United States
court's consideration of the actions of a foreign state regarding the property at issue
can only hinder or embarrass the President in the conduct of foreign relations when the
court acts to frustrate the foreign nation's expectations of dominion over property. Li-
bra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp 870, 884 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). In determining whether judicial consideration of the actions of a foreign govern-
ment would hinder or embarrass the President in the conduct of foreign relations, a
United States court may consider any positions the executive branch articulates. Allied
Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 473 U.S. 934 (1985). Any position the executive branch articulates does not
bind the judiciary, however, and the determination of the applicability of the act of
state doctrine is always a judicial question. Id. But see Bernstein v. Van Heyghen
Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246, 252 (2d Cir.) (Clark, C.J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that where the executive branch recognizes the validity of the act of a foreign state,
courts are bound to observe the determination of the President), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
772 (1947); see also Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-
Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954) (stating the President had unambigu-
ously indicated that it is the policy of the United States to undo the forced transfer of
property belonging to the victims of Nazi persecution). In light of this policy statement,
the court refused to apply the act of state doctrine to preclude its consideration of
claims that challenged the validity of the acts of the Third Reich. Id.
81. The International Rule of Law Act, 1981: Hearings on S. 1434 Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2, 22-24 (1981) [hereinafter IRLA Hearings] (statement of Professor Don Wal-
lace, Director of the International Law Institute, Georgetown University Law Center).
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the act of state doctrine.82 Pursuant to the Bernstein exception, a
United States court will not apply the act of state doctrine if the State
Department informs the court that the executive branch believes the
adjudication of the merits of a foreign sovereign's act will not inhibit
the ability of the President to conduct foreign relations.83 The Supreme
Court, however, has never accepted the validity of the Bernstein excep-
tion.84 The lack of Supreme Court acceptance, coupled with the reluc-
tance of the State Department to issue Bernstein letters8" significantly
limits the scope of the Bernstein exception.86
2. The Commercial Activities Exception
The commercial activities exception is the second judicially created
exception to the act of state doctrine.87 A court must first determine
82. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschap-
pij, 210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954) (holding that the clear expression of executive
policy renders application of the act of state doctrine unnecessary). The plaintiff, a
Jewish German, sued the Dutch holders of property that the Nazis confiscated during
the Second World War. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-
Maatschappij, 173 F.2d 71, 72-73, 75 n.18 (2d Cir. 1949). Previously, the plaintiff
unsuccessfully sued a Belgian corporation, also seeking recovery of property that the
Nazis confiscated. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246,
247 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). In this initial case, the act of state
doctrine precluded the court from considering the validity of the confiscations. Id. at
249.
83. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,
210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954). The letter from the State Department to the attor-
ney for the plaintiff unequivocally stated the position of the executive branch that the
application of the act of state doctrine in cases involving Nazi confiscations was unnec-
essary. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984, 985 (1952).
84. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706-11 (1976) (re-
fusing to apply the act of state doctrine despite a letter from Monroe Leigh, the Legal
Advisor to the Department of State). The State Department issued a letter indicating
that a judicial determination of the legality of any Cuban act involved in the litigation
would not inhibit the conduct of foreign policy. Id. at 710-11. Despite this letter, the
Court held the act of state doctrine inapplicable for other reasons. Id. at 696-707; see
also First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972) (plurality
opinion) (declining to apply the act of state doctrine). In First National City Bank,
however, only Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and White accepted the
validity of the Bernstein exception. Id. at 762-70 (Burger, C.J., Rehnquist & White,
JJ., plurality opinion). Justice Powell, while concurring in the result, rejected the ex-
ception. Id. at 774 (Powell, J., concurring in result only). Justice Brennan, joining with
Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun in dissent, rejected the exception as being
inconsistent with the reasoning of Sabbatino. Id. at 787-89 (Brennan, Stewart, Mar-
shall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
85. See Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325,
369-70 n.274 (1986) (indicating the reluctance of the State Department to issue Bern-
stein letters). The State Department receives two or three requests for such letters
annually. Id. As of 1986, the department had issued only seven Bernstein letters. Id.
86. Id. at 370.
87. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706 (1976). The corn-
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whether the state action at issue falls within the scope of the excep-
tion.88 Where the foreign government acts in its sovereign capacity,
United States courts must recognize foreign government actions taken
within the foreign government's own territory.89 When the foreign gov-
ernment acts in a proprietary capacity, however, the judiciary need not
defer to the actions of the foreign government, and the act of state
doctrine is inapplicable.90 As with the Bernstein exception, however,
the United States Supreme Court has not universally accepted the
commercial activities exception to the act of state doctrine.9"
3. The Treaty Exception
The treaty exception is the third judicially created exception to the
act of state doctrine.92 This exception requires a United States court to
reject application of the act of state doctrine when the challenged ac-
tions of a foreign state are the subject of a treaty between the United
States and the acting foreign nation.9 3 As with the other judicially cre-
ated exceptions to the act of state doctrine, however, United States
courts have not enthusiastically embraced the treaty exception. 4
mercial activities exception to the act of state doctrine results from the growing partici-
pation of foreign sovereigns in the international commercial markets. Id. at 705. The
commercial activities exception is consistent with the constitutional underpinnings of
the act of state doctrine. See id. at 704-07 (stating that judging the merits of the
commercial dealings of the foreign state will not offend that nation). Because a court
judging the commercial dealing of a foreign sovereign does not offend that sovereign,
its exercise of jurisdiction will not inhibit the ability of the President to conduct foreign
relations. See supra note 80 (describing the dependence of jurisdiction upon the Presi-
dent's need to conduct foreign policy).
88. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 696 (1976) (stating
that the judiciary should define the outer limits of the act of state doctrine).
89. See id. at 704-06 (holding that when a foreign government exercises powers
that are peculiar to sovereigns, the act of state doctrine precludes judicial examination
of the actions of the foreign government).
90. Id. at 704. When a foreign government engages in activities in which any pri-
vate citizen can engage, the act of state doctrine does not bar judicial evaluation of
those actions. Id. at 704, 707.
91. See id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring) (declining to recognize the commercial
activity exception to the act of state doctrine); id. (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that
even in situations involving purely political acts, the judiciary must decide whether
foreign policy objectives require judicial abstention). Justices Brennan, Stewart, and
Blackmun joined Justice Marshall in attacking the creation of a commercial activities
exception to the act of state doctrine. Id. at 716-37 (Marshall, Brennan, Stewart &
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
92. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
93. Id; see Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Social-
ist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422, 428 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing the 1953 Treaty of Amity be-
tween the United States and Ethiopia as justification for declining to apply the act of
state doctrine).
94. Bazyler, supra note 85, at 371; see International Ass'n of Machinists & Acro-
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III. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
IN FOREIGN BRANCH BANK EXPROPRIATION CASES
United States banks frequently raise the act of state doctrine in de-
fending against depositor demands for repayment of expropriated de-
posits."5 An essential component of the defense is the realization that a
deposit represents a single debt that the branch owes its depositorsY0 A
foreign government expropriation of the assets and liabilities of a
branch effectively represents a collection of the debt the branch owes
its depositors.97 A United States bank defending against depositor de-
mands for repayment of expropriated deposits argues that because the
expropriation took place within the territory of the expropriating na-
tion, a United States court cannot challenge the validity of the govern-
mental collection of the debt that the branch owed the depositor. This
prior collection of the debt, the bank argues, relieves the bank of liabil-
ity to satisfy the same debt a second time.9
The act of state doctrine, however, precludes only judicial considera-
tion of foreign expropriations that occur within the territory of the ex-
propriating nation.100 The territorial limitation of the act of state doc-
trine makes it applicable in foreign branch expropriation cases only if
the situs of the expropriated deposits, at the time of expropriation, is
the expropriating nation.101 Current situs determination methods, how-
ever, are inconsistent with the constitutional underpinnings of the act of
space Workers v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 649 F.2d
1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting the treaty exception to the act of state doctrine),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). The broad exceptions to the act of state doctrine
- the Bernstein exception, the commercial activity exception, and the treaty exception
- are all fundamentally inconsistent with the case-by-case approach to the act of state
doctrine the court adopted in Sabbatino. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425
U.S. 682, 728 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). This inconsistency explains the reluc-
tance of the Supreme Court to embrace these exceptions to the act of state doctrine.
95. See supra note I 1 (citing cases in which banks raised the act of state defense).
96. See 1 W. SCHLICHTING, supra note 8, § 9.02(1) (explaining the nature of the
debtor-creditor relationship arising from a bank deposit).
97. See Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 466, 463 N.E.2d
5, 11, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 695 (holding that the Cuban expropriation of the plaintiff's
certificates of deposit was equivalent to payment of the full amount of the certificates),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984).
98. See Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 466, 463 N.E.2d
5, 11, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 695 (accepting the argument of the bank that a confiscation
is an act of a foreign sovereign within its own territory and is not reviewable in a
United States court), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984).
99. See Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 652 (2d Cir. 1984)
(Kearse, J., dissenting) (stating that once a debt is collected pursuant to a valid decree,
the debt is extinguished).
100. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the territorial limita-
tions of the act of state doctrine).
101. Note, Fundamental Inquiry, supra note 20, at 124.
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state doctrine. Additionally, courts are split over which of these flawed
tests is the appropriate situs test and apply different tests in similar
factual settings. Finally, regardless of which flawed situs test a court
uses, inconsistent application of the act of state doctrine can create
gross inequities in foreign branch expropriation cases.
A. SITus DETERMINATION
A debt is an intangible asset that has no actual, physical location.10 2
Determining the situs of intangible property is a difficult task involving
abstract principles.10 3 Intangible property can only be 'located' within a
single jurisdiction as a matter of legal fiction.104 For act of state pur-
poses, courts consider a debt located within the state that has the abil-
ity to enforce or collect the debt.10 5 The ability of a state to enforce or
collect a debt depends on jurisdiction over the debtor.10 6 To determine
whether the expropriating state has jurisdiction over the debtor for act
of state purposes, United States courts employ one of three legal fic-
102. Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 651 (2d Cir. 1984)
(Kearse, J., dissenting); Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 476-
77, 463 N.E.2d 5, 11-12, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 696-97 (Wachtler, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984). Where an instrument is proof of a proprietary interest in
intangible property, such as a certificate of deposit or an account statement, courts do
not consider the location of the debt to be the physical location of the instrument evi-
dencing the interest in the intangible asset. 5 MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING § 326a
(1983). The document merely represents a debt, or the intangible property; it is not the
property itself. Id. Contra von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1140 (1966) (stating that where a docu-
ment embodies rights to intangible property, courts have held that the location of that
document within the territory of a nation establishes the right of that nation's courts to
exercise jurisdiction).
103. Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 714
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968). The situs of intangible property may be
one place for tax purposes, another place for venue, and yet another place for estate tax
purposes. Id. at 714-15.
104. See Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 476, 463 N.E.2d
5, I1, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 696 (Wachtler, J., dissenting) (stating that because intangi-
ble property has no real physical existence, determining the situs of the property is not
a question of fact), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984). Courts devise and apply ficti-
tious tests to determine the situs of the intangible property. Id.
105. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1976); Harris
v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222-23 (1905); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
660 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); United Bank Ltd.
v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 262, aff'd, 542 F.2d 868, 873 (2d Cir. 1976); Trinh
v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526, 1535 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Perez v. Chase Man-
hattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 470, 463 N.E.2d 5, 10, 474 NY.S.2d 689, 692,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984).
106. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1976); Harris
v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222-23 (1905); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
660 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Trinh v. Ci-
tibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526, 1536 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
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In Harris v. Balk,108 the Supreme Court ruled that a state has juris-
diction over a debtor whenever a creditor can effect service of process
on the debtor personally through the judicial mechanism of the state. 109
After noting that the ability of a state judiciary to effect personal ser-
vice on a debtor requires that the debtor be within the territorial limits
of the state,110 the Court in Harris formulated the traditionally ac-
cepted rule that a state has jurisdiction over a debtor only when the
debtor is actually present within the state.1 As the debtor moves from
state to state, so does the situs of the debt owed the creditor.11 2 A court
utilizing the domicile test in a foreign branch expropriation case will
hold that the expropriating country is the situs of the expropriated de-
posit, and the act of state doctrine applies if the branch is still operat-
ing in that country at the time of the expropriation. 1 3 If the branch
has ceased operation, however, the expropriating country is not the si-
tus of the deposits and the act of state doctrine will not apply."'
The domicile test of situs determination has recently come under in-
107. See infra notes 108-63 and accompanying text (discussing the legal tests
United States courts use to determine the situs of intangible property).
108. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
109. Id. at 221-22.
110. Id. at 221.
Ill. See id. at 222-23 (holding that where the debtor, a resident of North Caro-
lina, was actually present within the territory of Maryland, Maryland had jurisdiction
over the debtor); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 863
(2d Cir. 1981) (holding that because Chase had entirely ceased operations in Saigon, it
no longer maintained a presence in Vietnam, and was not subject to the jurisdiction of
the Vietnamese courts), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Republic of Iraq v. First
Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51-53 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that where the trust
company in possession of the property had no offices or any other presence in Iraq, Iraq
did not have jurisdiction over the debtor trust company), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027
(1966).
112. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905).
113. See Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 474-77, 463
N.E.2d 5, 10-11, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 695-97 (holding that because the Cuban branches
of Chase Manhattan were open at the time of the expropriation, the situs of the plain-
tiff's certificates of deposit was Cuba), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984). The act of
state doctrine relieved Chase from having to make a second payment on those certifi-
cates. Id.
114. See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 863 (2d
Cir. 1981) (holding that because Chase had entirely ceased operations in Saigon, it no
longer had a presence in Vietnam, and was not subject to the jurisdiction of Vietnam),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982). The situs of the deposits was not Vietnam, and the
act of state doctrine did not apply. Id.
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tense scrutiny and criticism.11 The test is unduly rigid and mechani-
cal," 6 and yields unfair results between private litigants." 7 Addition-
ally, the domicile test is inconsistent with the constitutional
underpinnings of the act of state doctrine."1 8
Even though the domicile test of situs determination enhances pre-
dictability in expropriation cases,""9 it creates an awkward situation for
banks operating foreign branches. During times of instability and social
turmoil, a United States bank with branches in an unstable country
must elect whether to close those branches or continue operations. If
the bank chooses to continue its foreign operations, it places the safety
of its foreign employees in jeopardy. 20 If the bank closes its branches,
however, and the foreign sovereign expropriates assets and liabilities of
the branches, the parent bank is unable to avail itself of the act of state
defense 12' and is exposed to double liability. 22 Therefore, the domicile
115. See Note, Fundamental Inquiry, supra note 20, at 125 (indicating that as a
result of deficiencies in the traditional domicile test, courts have recently held that thay
may base an exercise of jurisdiction over a debtor on factors other than domicile).
116. Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870,
884 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
117. Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 479, 463 N.E.2d 5,
14, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 698 (Wachtler, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966
(1984).
118. Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870,
884 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). In determining the threshold question of whether the confiscat-
ing country can exercise jurisdiction over the debtor, a United States court may violate
the separation of powers principles underlying the act of state doctrine. Perez v, Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 474-75, 463 N.E.2d 5, 12, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689,
695-96 (Wachtler, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984). Answering the
threshold question may result in the court undermining a position the President had
previously or secretly taken, thereby hindering the President in the conduct of foreign
relations. Id. at 476-77, 463 N.E.2d at 12, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
119. See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 863 (2d
Cir. 1981) (holding that the act of state doctrine did not apply because Chase closed its
Saigon branch prior to the expropriation decrees and, therefore, had no presence in
Vietnam at the time of the decree), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Perez v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 474, 463 N.E.2d 5, 11, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689,
695 (holding that because Cuban branches of Chase were open at the time of the
confiscation decree, Chase was subject to the jurisdiction of Cuba, and the act of state
doctrine relieved Chase of its obligation to comply with demands for repayment), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984). Under the domicile test, litigants can reasonably predict
the success of the act of state defense by ascertaining whether the foreign branch was
open at the time of the expropriation decree.
120. See Brief for Appellee at 7, Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981) (No. 81-7052) (stating that as the collapse of Saigon
appeared imminent, officials of Chase Manhattan anticipated massive Vietcong retalia-
tion against United States citizens and those associated with American interests), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982). The Vietcong, who had fought the United States for
more than a twelve years, placed a bounty on the head of the manager of the Saigon
branch of Chase Manhattan Bank. Id.
121. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.
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test forces United States banks to choose between two unattractive
alternatives.
Additionally, the domicile test is not an accurate reflection of the
principles underlying the territorial limitations of the act of state doc-
trine.'23 The act of state doctrine bars judicial consideration of a for-
eign expropriation carried out exclusively within the territory of the
expropriating nation124 because judicial consideration of such acts
would interfere with the ability of the President to conduct foreign re-
lations. 25 Judicial consideration of foreign decrees or actions, however,
will only inhibit the ability of the President to conduct foreign relations
when such consideration frustrates the foreign state's expectation of do-
minion over the subject matter of the litigation.'26
The domicile test does not adequately measure a foreign state's ex-
pectations of dominion over the subject matter of litigation. 27 The
domicile test of situs determination requires a court to determine the
applicability of the act of state doctrine solely on the basis of a single
fact: whether the branch was open at the time of the expropriation de-
cree.' 2 The test does not consider facts surrounding the creation of the
debtor-creditor relationship. 2 9 Consideration of such factors would al-
low a United States court to assess the expectations of the foreign soy-
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526,
1536 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
122. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 865 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526,
1536 (E.D. Mich. 1985); see infra note 220 (defining the concept of double liability);
see also notes 168-72 (explaining how the failure of a United States court to apply the
act of state doctrine requires a United States bank to satisfy the same obligation
twice).
123. Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870,
884 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
124. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (discussing the territorial limi-
tation of the act of state doctrine).
125. See supra notes 78-79 (discussing the separation of powers principles on
which the act of state doctrine is based).
126. See supra note 80 (discussing when judicial consideration of the actions of a
foreign government will interfere with the ability of the President to conduct foreign
relations).
127. Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870,
883-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
128. See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 863-64 (2d
Cir. 1981) (failing to apply the act of state doctrine solely because Chase had closed
the Saigon branch prior to the expropriation decrees), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976
(1982). Because its Saigon branch was closed, Chase did not have a presence within
the territory of Vietnam at the time of the decrees. Id. at 863.
129.. Cf. Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp.
870, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that the judiciary can obtain a more reasonable
measurement of the expectations of the foreign state by considering the facts surround-
ing the debt in question).
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ereign concerning dominion over the deposit relationship and examine
the proprietary interests arising from that relationship. Because the
domicile test fails to assess adequately the expectations of the foreign
sovereign, courts using the test risk frustrating the expectations of the
foreign sovereign and thereby hinder the ability of the President to con-
duct foreign relations.
2. Complete Fruition Test
United States courts increasingly employ the complete fruition situs
test rather than the inflexible, domicile test.130 The complete fruition
test is a common-sense test' 31 that more accurately reflects the expecta-
tions of the foreign government.132 Under this test, determining the si-
tus of the expropriated property and, thus, the applicability of the act
of state doctrine' 33 requires a United States court to determine whether
the purported taking came "to complete fruition within the dominion of
the [foreign] government." 3 Confiscation of private property comes to
complete fruition when the confiscating government has the parties and
the property before it, and subsequently acts to change the relationship
between the parties regarding the property. 35 When a confiscation
comes to complete fruition within the dominion of the expropriating
state, that state has jurisdiction over the debtor, and the situs of the
130. E.g., Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222, 224 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying
the complete fruition test); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago,
757 F.2d 516, 521 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 934 (1985); United Bank
Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 875 (2d Cir. 1976) (same); Tabacalera Severi-
ano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 714-15 (5th Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
131. Cf. Comment, The Act of State Doctrine, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 243, 250-
51 (1984) (stating that as a matter of common sense, a United States court should not
consider a foreign state's actions that come to complete fruition within that state be-
cause at that point, the court's opinion is irrelevant).' When an expropriation comes to
complete fruition within the territory of the expropriating state, it is futile for a United
States court to nullify or ignore the completed act. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito
Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
The expropriating state is unlikely to give effect to a United States court opinion that is
inconsistent with its own actions. Id.
132. See infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text (discussing the complete frui-
tion situs determination test).
133. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (stating that the applicability of
the act of state doctrine depends on the situs of the property being the confiscating
state).
134. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
135. Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1122-23 (5th Cit. 1985); Taba-
calera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 715 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
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expropriated property is the foreign state.1 36 In such situations the act
of state doctrine will bar judicial consideration of claims questioning
the validity of the completed expropriation. 37
The complete fruition test is a two-prong test. First, in foreign
branch expropriation cases both the creditor (depositor) and the debtor
(bank) must be present within the territory of the confiscating state.1 M
Second, in all cases, the subject matter of the litigation must have its
situs within the territory of the acting state.13 9 In foreign branch expro-
priation cases, courts tend to rely heavily on the provisions of the de-
posit contract for determining the situs of the deposit 40 and, therefore,
the applicability of the act of state doctrine. When the deposit contract
provides for repayment of the deposit in United States dollars, in the
United States, subject to the laws of the United States, the situs of the
deposit is the United States.14 1 These contractual provisions give the
United States a significant interest in the debtor-creditor relationship
and, therefore, lessen the expectations of dominion of the foreign state
over the banking relationship and the proprietary interests resulting
from that relationship. 42 Where the expropriating state has a reduced
expectation of dominion of the expropriated property, judicial consider-
ation of its actions is less likely to interfere with the President in the
136. Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222, 225 (2d Cir. 1985).
137. Id.
138. See Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706,
713-16 (5th Cir.) (holding, in part, that because the defendant was a Florida corpora-
tion with no presence in Cuba at the time of the expropriation decree, Cuba was not
able to perform a fait accompli, and the act of state doctrine did not apply), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
139. See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516,
521-22 (2d Cir.) (explaining that because the situs of the debt at the time of the ex-
change control regulations was New York, the government was not in a position to
perform a fait accompli and the act of state doctrine did not apply), cert. denied, 473
U.S. 934 (1985).
140. See Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222, 224-25 (2d Cir. 1985) (basing
a situs determination solely on the provisions of the certificates of deposits the bank
issued to its depositors).
141. See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516,
522-23 (2d Cir.) (holding that where the contract provides for repayment in New
York, New York is the situs of the debt), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 934 (1985); see also
Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870, 886
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that where the bank incurred the debt in New York, and
made partial repayment in New York, New York was the situs of the debt).
142. United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 875 (2d Cir. 1976)
(holding that the inability of a foreign state to bring an expropriation to complete frui-
tion within its territory reduces the foreign state's expectations of dominion over the
property). Contractual provisions establishing the proprietary interest outside the terri-
tory of the state reduces the state's expectations of dominion. Allied Bank Int'l v.
Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 473
U.S. 934 (1985).
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conduct of foreign relations." 3
Courts using the complete fruition test recognize that when a foreign
government is in a position to perform a fait accompli,'" it is an af-
front to the confiscating state's expectations of dominion over the bank-
ing relationship for courts to ignore or nullify actions based on those
expectations.145 In the context of analyzing a deposit contract, the com-
plete fruition test more accurately reflects the principles underlying the
act of state doctrine than does the domicile test. The complete fruition
test allows a United States court to consider a number of factors in
balancing the interests of the United States against those of the confis-
cating nation, rather than look solely at whether the foreign branch
was open at the time of expropriation. 46 Consideration of these addi-
tional factors provides the court with a better understanding of the ex-
pectations of dominion over the debtor-creditor relationship. 47 A better
understanding of the expectations of the foreign government lessens the
likelihood that a United States court will frustrate those expectations
and thereby inhibit the ability of the President to conduct foreign rela-
tions. 48 The complete fruition test, therefore, is more consistent with
constitutional underpinnings of the act of state doctrine than the domi-
cile test.
In addition to providing a more accurate measurement of the expec-
tations of the foreign government, the complete fruition test allows the
parties to decide who shall bear the risk of loss resulting from expropri-
143. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521-22
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
144. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 538 (defining a fait accompli
as an accomplished, usually irreversible deed).
145. Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1121-23 (5th Cir. 1985); Allied
Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 473 U.S. 934 (1985); Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co.,
392 F.2d 706, 715 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
146. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (stating that the domicile test con-
siders only one factor: whether the foreign branch was open at the time of the
expropriation).
147. See Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp.
870, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that consideration of factors surrounding the debt
enables a United States court to appreciate fully the expectations of the foreign state);
cf. infra note 152 and accompanying text (explaining that while the complete fruition
test provides a more accurate picture of the expectations of a foreign state than the
domicile test, it does not go far enough); id. (stating that the complete fruition test
erroneously focuses almost exclusively on the provisions of the deposit contract).
148. See Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp.
870, 881-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that the consideration of objective factors, such
as the place of contracting, the place of repayment, and the currency of account make
it unlikely that a court will frustrate the expectations of a foreign sovereign).
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ation.149 If the parties to the deposit contract agree that repayment will
be in United States dollars, in the United States, then the situs of the
deposit will be the United States, and the act of state doctrine will not
relieve the United States bank of its obligation to its depositor, regard-
less of foreign government intervention.150 The risk of loss from govern-
mental interference will remain with the debtor bank. The parties,
however, can shift the risk of loss that governmental interference
causes to the depositors by providing for repayment solely within the
territory of the confiscating state in local currency. The situs of the
deposit, therefore, will be the confiscating state, and the act of state
doctrine will relieve the United States bank of its obligation to repay
the depositors of the branch in the event of an expropriation. 1 '
Although the complete fruition test provides a more accurate mea-
surement of the expectations and interests of the confiscating state than
does the domicile test, it is not flawless. The test focuses exclusively on
the provisions of the deposit contract ignoring other factors that may
provide a true, precise measurement of the expectations of the foreign
government.15 1 Without consideration of the events that preceded or
followed the creation of the deposit contract, a United States court can-
not fully understand the expectations and interests of the foreign gov-
ernment. This lack of understanding increases the likelihood that the
court will act in contravention of those expectations, and interfere with
the ability of the President to conduct foreign relations.
3. Incidents of the Debt Test
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized the necessity
of expanding the scope of its situs analysis beyond the four corners of
149. See Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 651-52 (2d Cir.
1984) (Kearse, J., dissenting) (stating that the parties were free to contract for collec-
tion any place in the world). Had the parties agreed that collection could not take place
in Cuba, the situs of the debt would not be Cuba, and the act of state doctrine would
not relieve Chase of its liability to the depositors. Id. at 652 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
150. See Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp.
870, 881-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that where the parties provide for repayment in
New York, the situs of the debt is New York, and the Bank of Costa Rica must bear
any risks associated with the decrees of its government).
151. See Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 469-70, 463
N.E.2d 5, 9, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 693 (stating that because the contract provided for the
possibility of repayment in Cuba, Cuba was the situs of the debt), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 966 (1984). Therefore, the act of state doctrine barred judicial consideration of
claims challenging the Cuban expropriation. Id.
152. Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870,
884 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that consideration of the facts surrounding the creation
of the debt provides a more accurate measurement of the expectations of the foreign
state than does consideration of the debtor's domicile alone).
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the deposit contract. 5 ' In Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 5 the fifth circuit
created the incidents of the debt test.' 55 The test focuses on "where the
incidents of the debt, as a whole, place it."' 5 Determination of where
the incidents of the debt took place requires the court to consider a
number of factors: the place where the deposit is carried, 1 the place of
repayment, 58 the intentions of the parties, 59 and the involvement of
the United States regulatory agencies.' 6
Consideration of these factors allows a United States court to deter-
mine if the interests of the confiscating state in regulating the deposit
relationship outweigh the interests of the United States in supervising
the relationship. 6' If the interests of the confiscating state outweigh
those of the United States, judicial consideration of the propriety of its
actions regarding the deposit relationship will antagonize the foreign
state and interfere with the ability of the President to conduct foreign
relations.'62 By enabling United States courts to consider these addi-
153. Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1985).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1123.
156. Id.
157. Id.; see also Dunn v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 374 F.2d 876, 877-78 (5th Cir.
1967) (holding that the place where the deposit is held, absent contrary contractual
provisions, is the situs of the deposit).
158. Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985); see Allied
Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521-22 (2d Cir.) (stat-
ing that where the defendant bank issues promissory notes providing for repayment in
New York, New York is the situs of the obligation), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
159. Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985); see Weston
Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, A.S., 57 N.Y.2d 315, 324-25, 442 N.E.2d
1195, 1199, 456 N.Y.S.2d 684, 688 (1982) (stating that where the parties intend New
York to be the jurisdiction for resolution of disputes, the situs of the debt is New
York).
160. Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985). In the case
of foreign branches, the involvement of the United States regulatory authorities is actu-
ally very minimal. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has primary
regulatory authority over the international operations of United States banks. Frankel,
International Banking - Structural Aspects of Regulation, in BUSINESS CONDITIONS
3-4 (Oct. 1974). Although the Federal Reserve administers applications to establish
foreign branches, the Federal Reserve leaves the examination of branch operations to
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). J. BAKER, supra note 37, at 27.
The OCC usually confines its examination to duplicate records that the branch files
with its parent. E. SYMMONS & J. WHITE, supra note 8, at 753. The foreign branches
of United States banks are generally not subject to the regulations imposed on their
domestic counterparts, including interest rate limitation, reserve requirements, and de-
posit insurance. Id. at 749-52.
161. Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1124 (5th Cir. 1985); Allied Bank
Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521-22 (2d Cir.) (balancing
the interests of the United States against those of Costa Rica), cert. denied, 473 U.S.
934 (1985).
162. See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1124-26 (5th Cir. 1985) (hold-
ing that the incidents of the debt indicated that the interests of Mexico in the debtor-
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tional factors concerning the debtor-creditor relationship, the inci-
dents of the debt test is the situs determination test most consistent
with the separation of powers principle underlying the act of state
doctrine. 163
B. LACK OF CONSENSUS ON APPROPRIATE SITUs DETERMINATION
TEST
The history of the act of state doctrine in expropriation of intangible
property cases shows that the applicability of the doctrine is a function
of the particular situs determination test employedY3' Despite the im-
portance of situs determination, however, there is no consensus among
United States courts on which situs determination test is the appropri-
ate test. 65 A 1985 district court case in Michigan, Trinh v. Citibank,
N.A."6' shows how the application of different situs determination tests
creditor relationship outweighed those of the United States and that it would offend the
Mexican government for a United States court to consider the merits of its exchange
control regulations).
163. Id. at 1123. Less than one year after the decision in Callejo, the fifth circuit
abruptly abandoned the incidents of the debt test of situs determination. Grass v. Cred-
ito Mexicano, S.A., 797 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1575
(1987). In Grass, the fifth circuit did not undertake situs determination. Id. at 221.
The petition for certiorari presented the question whether courts should abandon situs
determination in act of state cases. Id. Given the lack of consensus on the appropriate
test, abandoning situs determination in act of state cases may be advisable. See infra
note 165 and accompanying text (discussing the split among the circuits concerning the
appropriate situs determination test).
164. See Note, Fundamental Inquiry, supra note 20, at 124 (explaining that situs
determination is of critical importance in determining the applicability of the act of
state doctrine); see also supra notes 108-63 and accompanying text (analyzing the
three situs determination tests).
165. Compare Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying
the incidents of the debt test in litigation arising from Mexican exchange control re-
strictions) with Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying the
complete fruition test in a factual situation virtually identical to Callejo). Additionally,
there is a lack of consensus within each circuit. Compare Grass v. Credito Mexicano,
S.A. 797 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1986) (abandoning situs analysis entirely), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 1575 (1987) with Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985)
(employing the incident of the debt test of situs determination); compare Braka v.
Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985) (using the complete fruition test) with
Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981) (employ-
ing the domicile test), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
166. Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Mich. 1985). The plaintiff's
father deposited two million Vietnamese piasters in the Saigon branch of Citibank on
July 25, 1974. Id. at 1528. He made another deposit of one million plasters on October
25, 1974. Id. The plaintiff, a student in Michigan during the final years of the war,
learned about the bank account in 1979, when the Vietnamese government released his
father from a Vietnamese reeducation camp. Id. In May 1980, the plaintiff contacted
the international division of Citibank in New York to inquire about the account. Id.
The defendant stated that the National Bank of Vietnam was responsible for the three
million piaster deposit. Id. After the defendant repeated its position on November 17,
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in a single scenario can lead to different conclusions on the applicability
of the act of state doctrine. The following section discusses both the
actual use of the domicile test in Trinh and the potential ramifications
of the hypothetical use of the incidents of the debt test in the same
scenario.
In Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 117 the district court, applying the domi-
cile test of situs determination, held that the closing of Citibank's Sai-
gon branch ended its presence in Vietnam.168 Because Citibank was not
present within the territory of Vietnam at the time of the expropriation
decrees, Vietnam did not have jurisdiction over Citibank and could not
enforce or collect the debt the branch owed its depositors. 6 9 Therefore,
the United States - not Vietnam - was the situs of the deposits at
the time of the expropriation.7 0 Because the expropriation decree
sought to expropriate property outside Vietnamese territory, the act of
state doctrine did not bar judicial consideration of the claim question-
ing the validity of the Vietnamese decrees.' 7 ' The act of state doctrine,
therefore, did not relieve Citibank of its obligation to honor the repay-
ment demands of its Saigon depositors.
172
In comparison, if the district court had employed the incidents of the
debt test, a different outcome would have resulted. The deposit contract
between the Saigon branch and a Vietnamese citizen indicates that the
branch carried the deposit.'17 The deposit contract called for repay-
ment in Saigon, 7 4 and the parties to the contract intended the laws of
Vietnam to govern the deposit relationship.1 5 Finally, the Saigon
branch was subject to only rudimentary supervision by the United
States regulatory agencies.' 6 Consequently, the incidents of the debt as
1980, the plaintiff initiated the suit. Id.
167. Id.





173. See Heininger, supra note 49, at 975 (stating that a deposit is considered held
at the branch that is a party to the deposit contract).
174. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (showing that ordinarily, a deposit
contract is repayable only at the branch where the contract was made).
175. See E. RoUSSAKIS, supra note 24, at 17 (stating that a United States bank
operating an overseas branch expects to be subject to the laws of the host country). A
United States bank operating an overseas branch does not intend to offer its overseas
customers any greater protections than those afforded to locally incorporated banks.
Logan & Kantor, supra note 49, at 334-35.
176. See supra notes 49, 160 (discussing the role of United States banking authori-
ties in the supervision of foreign branches of United States banks).
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a whole would have placed the debt in Vietnam.'"7 Under this test, the
situs of the debt was Vietnam; Vietnam, therefore, had jurisdiction
over Citibank at the time of the expropriation decrees. 178 The act of
state doctrine, therefore, would preclude the district court from ques-
tioning or challenging the actions of the provisional revolutionary gov-
ernment taken within its territory. 7 9 The district court would have to
accept the Vietnamese action as a collection of the debt owed the Sai-
gon depositors.'1 0 Therefore, the expropriation would have extinguished
the debt and relieved Citibank of its obligation to the depositors of the
Saigon branch.181
This hypothetical discussion clearly illustrates the effects of the lack
of judicial agreement on the appropriate situs determination test. The
liability of the United States bank depends on the jurisdiction in which
the depositor brings suit. If the Trinh suit had been brought in a juris-
diction that follows the incidents of the debt test developed in the fifth
circuit, the act of state doctrine would have shielded Citibank from
liability. Such a situation promotes forum shopping rather than fair
adjudication of foreign branch expropriation cases.
C. POSSIBLE INEQUITIES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR NONUSE OF
THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The act of state doctrine, when applied in foreign branch expropria-
tion cases, relieves a United States bank of its obligation to repay the
depositors of its expropriated branch."8" The rule, however, does not
make allowances for the possibility that the expropriating nation will
confiscate only a limited percentage of the assets and liabilities of the
branch.183 Consequently, when a foreign state expropriates less than
177. See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1123-25 (5th Cir. 1985) (hold-
ing that consideration of these factors placed the debt in Mexico).
178. Cf. id. (holding that where the incidents of the debt places it within Mexico,
the act of state doctrine is applicable).
179. See id. (holding that consideration of the Mexican exchange control restric-
tions would be a serious affront to Mexico).
180. See Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 473, 463 N.E.2d
5, 11, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 695 (stating that application of the act of state doctrine
requires a court to accept the expropriation as a collection of the debt), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 966 (1984).
181. See id. (holding that where courts apply the act of state doctrine because the
Cuban confiscation amounted to collection of the debt owed, the doctrine relieves
Chase of any obligation to make a second payment on the same debt).
182. Id.
183. See S. KHOURY, supra note 44, at 81 (stating that banks derive 231% of the
assets of a foreign branch from obligations of other components of the parent's interna-
tional banking network). It is doubtful that a confiscating state could require surrender
of these assets. Heininger, supra note 49, at 999-1000.
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100% of the branch assets, application of the act of state doctrine al-
lows the United States parent to escape responsibility for 100% of the
liabilities of the branch and provides the parent with an unexpected,
unearned windfall profit. 1 4 Courts should not permit United States
banks to use the act of state doctrine as a tool to exact unfair profits at
the expense of foreign depositors.
When courts do not apply the doctrine, as in Vishipco Line v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A.18 5 and Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 18 the foreign
depositors can recoup their deposits from the parent bank in the United
States. 8" Such a rule allows foreign depositors to avail themselves of
the stability and protections the United States banking system pro-
vides, 88 without having to pay the price United States depositors must
pay 89 for that stability and protection. 90 Deriving a benefit without
paying the price others must pay for the same benefit, however, is anti-
thetical to the values underlying the United States position on expropri-
ations. 9' Therefore, United States courts should not allow foreign de-
positors to avail themselves of the protections of the United States
banking system unless they pay the price of those protections.
92
184. Heininger, supra note 49, at 999-1000.
185. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
186. Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
187. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526,
1536 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
188. See, e.g., National Banking Act of 1864, ch. 106, § 29, 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1982)
(placing limits on the total number of loans and extensions of credit a bank can make
to one person at any one time); Federal Reserve Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 12 U.S.C. §
264 (1982) (establishing a permanent deposit insurance fund); Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, ch. 240, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982) (restricting
the activities of companies that own or control commercial banks). The goal of federal
banking legislation is to ensure the stability and efficiency of the nation's financial insti-
tutions. S. REP. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3532, 3535-36.
189. M. WEIDENBAUM, supra note 49, at 69. Federal regulation of financial institu-
tions indirectly costs United States citizens over one billion dollars annually. Id.
190. See supra note 49 (explaining that foreign branches are generally free of the
costly restrictions imposed on their domestic counterparts).
191. Cf Note from Secretary of State Cordell Hull to Mexico's Minister of For-
eign Affairs, July 1938, reprinted in 3 G.H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 655-61 (1942) (stating the United States opposes any government taking private
property without paying for it); see also D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 71, at 266-67
(explaining the equitable principle of just compensation).
The Board of Governors has unequivocally stated that depositors of foreign branches
whose deposits are not subject to the restrictions of Regulations D or Q may not obtain
the benefits and privileges of the United States regulatory framework. Logan & Kan-
tor, supra note 49, at 336.
192. But cf. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 660 F.2d 854, 856 (2d
Cir. 1981) (allowing a Vietnamese depositor of the defendant Saigon branch to recover
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IV. LEGISLATIVE HOSTILITY TOWARD THE ACT OF
STATE DOCTRINE
United States courts have shown a tendency to curtail the scope of
the act of state doctrine through the creation of broad exceptions to the
doctrine. 93 At times, however, the judiciary, refusing to yield to
outside political considerations, has applied the traditional act of state
doctrine and rendered decisions unpalatable to the legislative branch.1'
Such decisions routinely elicit legislative responses to the inequities
that legislators believe are inherent in the act of state doctrine.las Two
manifestations of this legislative opposition to the act of state doctrine
are the International Rule of Law Act of 1981,190 and the proposed
its deposits in the United States), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Trinh v. Citibank,
N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526, 1536 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (same). The Vishipco and Trinh
decisions allowing depositors of foreign branches to recover their deposits in the United
States is contrary to the position of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. See Logan & Kantor, supra note 49, at 336 (stating that depositors of a for-
eign branch should not be able to recover their deposits from the parent bank in the
United States). United States courts, however, ordinarily accord great deference to the
decisions and opinions of administrative or regulatory agencies. Therefore, the decisions
in Vishipco and Trinh are also contrary to the long-standing judicial practice of defer-
ring to regulatory agencies in cases concerning their area of expertise.
193. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Bernstein excep-
tion to the act of state doctrine); supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text (introduc-
ing the commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine); supra notes 92-94
and accompanying text (examining the treaty exception to the act of state doctrine).
194. See Comment, Limiting the Act of State Doctrine: A Legislative Initiative, 23
VA. J. INT'L L. 103, 113 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, Limiting the Act of State
Doctrine] (describing the intense lobbying effort surrounding the decision in
Sabbatino).
195. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d)(4), 78
Stat. 1009, 1013 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982)) [hereinafter Hick-
enlooper Amendment] (containing the first congressional attempt to limit the applica-
tion of the act of state doctrine). The Hickenlooper Amendment was a direct response
to the Supreme Court decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. Comment,
Limiting the Act of State Doctrine, supra note 194, at 113. The Hickenlooper Amend-
ment precludes United States courts from invoking the act of state doctrine and refus-
ing to judge the merits of a case involving a claim of title or other rights to property
taken in violation of international law. Hickenlooper Amendment, supra. The amend-
ment has not received widespread judicial recognition. Bazyler, supra note 85, at 393.
The judiciary, in opposition to congressional encroachment on the judicially created
act of state doctrine, has so narrowly interpreted the language of the Hickenlooper
Amendment as to preclude its application. Comment, Limiting the Act of State Doc-
trine, supra note 194, at 114 n.61; Note, Harvest of Sabbatino, supra note 35, at 96-
97. In fact, only two courts have successfully invoked the Hickenlooper Amendment:
West v. Multibanco Comerex, 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2483
(1987), and Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967). The Hick-
enlooper Amendment is the subject of countless articles and commentaries. This Com-
ment, however, discusses the Hickenlooper Amendment solely for historical purposes.
The primary concern of this Comment is the most recent attempts to alter or abolish
the act of state doctrine.
196. S. 1434, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 13,960 (1981).
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amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.197
While each proposal died in Congressional committee, they must not be
viewed in isolation. The International Rule of Law Act of 1981 and the
proposed amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, as the only pieces of proposed legislation in the 1980s to attack
the scope of the act of state doctrine, are merely the most recent exam-
ples of the conflict between the judiciary and Congress over the proper
scope of the act of state doctrine.
A. THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW ACT OF 1981
Senators Mathias and Dominici introduced the International Rule of
Law Act (IRLA) in 1981.198 The IRLA provided that "no court in the
United States shall decline on the ground of the Federal Act of State
doctrine to make a determination on the merits in any case in which
the act of state is contrary to international law."' 99 This proposed cur-
tailment of the act of state doctrine contained two fatal flaws. First,
there is no universally accepted rule of international law on expropria-
tions.2 0 Second, the IRLA would have effectively eliminated a defense
for United States banks in foreign branch expropriation cases and
thereby subject the banks to the risk of double liability.21
1. Lack of Clear Consensus on International Law
Every government possesses the right to expropriate private property
197. H.R. 3137, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in Proposed Amendments
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Hearings on H.R. 3137 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986) [hereinafter FSIA Hearings].
198. S. 1434, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 13,959 (1981). The Interna-
tional Rule of Law Act was a response to growing dissatisfaction with the piecemeal
approach of evolving judicial precedent on the act of state doctrine. Lacey, supra note
55, at 11. Senators Charles Mathias and Peter Dominici introduced the bill on June 25,
1981, less than two months after the second circuit heard oral arguments in Vishipco
Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. S. 1434, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CoNG. ReC.
13,959-60 (1981). Citicorp and Chase Manhattan Bank were two of the three Fortune
500 corporations giving opinions on S. 1434. IRLA Hearings, supra note 81, at 130-35,
143-46. Given these facts, it is reasonable to conclude that S. 1434 was, in part, a
response to the application of the act of state doctrine in foreign branch expropriation
cases such as Vishipco. It is possible that as cases follow the reasoning of Vishipco,
efforts to amend or abolish the act of state doctrine will increase.
199. S. 1434, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3 (1981), reprinted in IRLA Hearings, supra
note 81, at 4.
200. See infra notes 205-11 and accompanying text (discussing the international
law on expropriations).
201. See infra notes 218-24 and accompanying text (discussing the consequences of
eliminating the act of state doctrine in foreign branch expropriation cases).
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within its jurisdiction for public use when the exigencies of public wel-
fare so demand.20 2 Industrialized nations, led by the United States, ex-
pect governments to take private property on a nondiscriminatory ba-
sis 203 and confiscate private property solely to ameliorate the welfare of
the population of the confiscating nation.2°
There is, however, no international consensus on the standard of
compensation in expropriation cases. 205 According to the United States,
an international minimum standard exists, which requires the expropri-
ating state to provide prompt, adequate, and effective compensation to
aliens whose property is confiscated.2 06 Newly independent and devel-
oping nations, however, do not espouse this principle of compensa-
tion. 07 These nations view such an interpretation of state responsibility
as a rule of the former imperial powers and claim it is not binding
without their consent.20 The standard that the newly independent and
developing nations prefer is a national treatment standard.20 9 This rule
202. 45 Am. JUR. 2D Intl Law § 83 (1969).
203. State Department Press Release No. 630, supra note 71.
204. Id.
205. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-31 (1964) (stating
that there are few areas in international law on which opinion is so divided as the
limitations on the power of a state to expropriate the property of aliens). There is a
sharp conflict between the industrialized and developing countries on the duty to com-
pensate property owners for expropriated property. Id. at 429-30. The disagreement
involves a basic divergence between the national interests of capital importing and capi-
tal exporting nations and between the social ideologies of countries that favor state
control of the means of production and those that adhere to a free enterprise system.
Id. at 430.
206. State Department Press Release No. 630, supra note 71. A state should pro-
vide appropriate compensation to the owner of foreign property. G.A. Res. 3281, 29
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). In the view of the
United States, appropriate compensation, in accordance with international law, is
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. Schwebel, The Story of the U.N.'s Dec-
laration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 49 A.B.A. J. 463, 465-66
(1963).
207. See Vicufia, The International Regulation of Valuation Standards and
Processes: A Reexamination of Third World Perspectives, in 3 THE VALUATION OF
NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 134 (R. Lillich ed. 1975) (noting
that "it is neither possible nor desirable to try to establish a single standard or principle
for the compensation of nationalized foreign property as a universal rule of interna-
tional law").
208. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 429-30 (1964). The
United States and Europe forced most Latin American countries to submit disputes
relating to denial of justice and responsibility of states to international arbitration
tribunals that applied the law of the great powers. B. WESTON, R. FALK & A.
D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 697 (1980). Consequently, there
is no denying that "the history of the development of international law on the responsi-
bility of states for injuries to aliens" is related to "imperialism, or dollar diplomacy."
Id. at 698. The development of these laws were "based almost entirely on the unequal
relations between the Great Powers and the small states." Id.
209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
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limits the responsibility of the expropriating state to afford alien prop-
erty owners the same treatment accorded domestic property owners.2"'
Under this standard, there is no automatic right to compensation for
expropriated property.
21'
The lack of a clear consensus on the international standards gov-
erning state responsibility to compensate alien property owners for ex-
propriated property inhibits United States courts from adjudicating
cases on the merits.212 Under the proposal, prior to addressing the mer-
its of a case, a United States court must determine whether the uncom-
pensated expropriation is a violation of international law.213 This is an
extremely difficult task because there is no consensus on what consti-
tutes international law on compensation for expropriations.214 If a
United States court concludes that a foreign nation violated interna-
tional law, it will antagonize that nation.215 Such antagonism would
hinder the ability of the President to conduct foreign relations.1 6 Con-
sequently, rather than risk creating an embarrassing situation for the
President, United States courts will likely refrain from classifying the
acts of foreign states as violations of international law, and allow appli-
cation of the act of state doctrine instead."'
165 comment a (1965). Each state is entitled to settle any disputes concerning compen-
sation and mode of payment in accordance with its national legislation. G.A. Res.
3171, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973). Accordingly,
the question of compensation is settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing
state and through tribunals. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 52,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
65 comment a (1965).
211. See Note from Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs to Secretary of State
Cordell Hull, August 3, 1938, reprinted in 3 G.H. HACKWORTH, supra note 191, at
655-61 (stating that many countries believe there is no automatic duty to compensate
for expropriating private property). Mexico is under an obligation to determine the
time and manner of compensation through its own laws. Id. at 658.
212. Letter of Patrick J. Mulhern, Senior Vice-President and General Counsel of
Citibank, N.A., reprinted in IRLA Hearings, supra note 81, at 143, 144-45 (1981)
[hereinafter Citibank Letter].
213. See supra text accompanying note 199 (stating that the International Rule of
Law Act would require United States courts to adjudicate the merits of a case when
the actions of foreign states violate international law).
214. See supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text (discussing the conflicting
opinions on the standards of state responsibility in expropriation cases).
215. IRLA Hearings, supra note 81, at 130, 133 (statement of the Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, N.A.).
216. Id.
217. See supra note 199 (implying that the act of state doctrine will apply when
the actions of the foreign state do not conflict with international law).
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2. Denial of an Affirmative Defense for United States Banks
The sponsors of the IRLA intended it to facilitate the fair and just
resolution of disputes.218 In foreign branch expropriation cases, how-
ever, the bill would have had the opposite effect.219 Denial of the act of
state defense would have greatly increased the risk of double liability
for a United States bank operating branches abroad.2 0 For example,
Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. clearly illustrates the potential
consequences of eliminating the act of state defense. In Perez, the Cu-
ban government confiscated certificates of deposit (CDs) of individuals
associated with the Batista regime.22' When the holders of the CDs
sued Chase Manhattan Bank in New York for repayment, the New
York Court of Appeals ruled that the act of state doctrine precluded
the court from examining the confiscation decrees of the Cuban govern-
ment.22 The decision prevented Chase from having to pay twice on the
same accounts.223 In Perez, denial of the act of state defense would
have forced Chase Manhattan Bank to assume double liability for the
deposits of the Cuban branches. 224 Elimination of the act of state de-
fense through the IRLA, by increasing the risks of double liability,
would have inhibited United States banks from expanding their inter-
national banking networks, thereby jeopardizing their roles as leaders
in international banking.
B. 1985 AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES
ACT OF 1976
A bill, H.R. 3137 was introduced in 1985 in the United States House
218. See IRLA Hearings, supra note 81, at 130 (statement of the Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, N.A.) (stating that any attempt to preclude a party from adjudicating the
merits of a case is immediately suspect. and the IRLA is a laudable attempt to open
courts to full adjudication of the merits of a claim).
219. See Citibank Letter, supra note 212, at 144-45 (stating that the proposed bill
would inhibit courts from determining cases on the merits where the act of state is not
a clear violation of international law).
220. See IRLA Hearings, supra note 81, at 132-33 (statement of the Chase Man-
hattan Bank, N.A.) (defining the concept of double liability). If a United States court
determines that a confiscation violates international law, it imposes liability on the
United States bank for deposits that the bank has already paid to the foreign govern-
ment through the expropriation. Id. Double payment is clearly unfair. Id.
221. Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 467, 463 N.E.2d 5, 6.
474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984).
222. Id. at 471, 463 N.E.2d at 9, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
223. Id. at 474, 463 N.E.2d at 11, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
224. Contra id. at 474, 463 N.E.2d at 11, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 695 (holding the act of
state doctrine relieved Chase Manhattan Bank of liability for the debt it had already
paid).
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of Representatives to amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (FSIA). 225 The primary purpose of the bill was to clarify the defi-
nition of "commercial activity" contained in the FSIA.226 Additionally,
the bill sought to curtail the application of the act of state doctrine in
cases in which a foreign sovereign became a litigant. 27 Section 3 of
H.R. 3137 precluded application of the act of state doctrine in expro-
priation, breach of contract, and arbitration cases brought pursuant to
the FSIA. 28 The bill, however, would have had absolutely no effect in
foreign branch expropriation cases, even if it had survived hearings
before the Administrative Law and Governmental Relations Subcom-
mittee of the House Judiciary Committee. The bill would have been
ineffective for two reasons. First, the very language of the act of state
provision rendered the provision inapplicable in foreign branch expro-
priation cases. Second, even if Congress revised the flawed language of
the act of state doctrine provision, the jurisdictional requirements of
the FSIA would have precluded application of any modified act of state
provision.
The limitations on the application of the act of state doctrine con-
tained in H.R. 3137 applied only to actions against a foreign sovereign,
its agents, or instrumentalities. 9 Foreign branch expropriation cases,
however, ordinarily involve a depositor of the expropriated branch, and
the United States parent of the branch.230 Therefore, because the re-
225. FSIA Hearings, supra note 197, at 1.
226. See id. at 18 (testimony of the Honorable Don Edwards) (stating that the
ambiguity concerning the definition of commercial activity shields a sovereign state
from the jurisdiction of United States courts). To cure this problem, H.R. 3137 pro-
vides that any property of a foreign state that is used or intended for commercial activ-
ity in the United States may be reached to satisfy a judgment. Id. at 20. Commercial
activities include any foreign state's promise to pay, issue debt security, and guarantee
another party's payment. H.R. 3137, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1985), reprinted in
FSIA Hearings, supra note 197, at 5. But see 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1982) (defining
commercial activities and noting the narrow definition of commercial activity for pur-
poses of the FSIA). In determining whether a transaction is a commercial activity,
courts must examine the nature rather than the purpose of the transaction. Id. Activity
in which a private party ordinarily engages is commercial activity under the FSIA, and
a foreign state is not entitled to immunity when engaged in this activity. International
Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), 477 F. Supp. 553, 566-67 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affd, 649 F.2d 1354
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
227. See H.R. 3137, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1985), reprinted in FSIA Hearings,
supra note 197, at 6-7 (noting that the reduction of a foreign state's activities granted
immunity).
228. FSIA Hearings, supra note 197 at 33 (statement of Elizabeth G. Verville,
Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State).
229. Id. at 36.
230. Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984) (involv-
ing an expropriated Cuban branch and New York main office of Chase Manhattan
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strictions contained in H.R. 3137 applied only in cases involving a for-
eign sovereign, and foreign branch expropriation cases are not such
cases, H.R. 3137 would have been irrelevant in foreign branch expro-
priation cases.
The State Department, however, raised the possibility of eliminating
the restrictive language of the act of state provisions contained in H.R.
3137.231 Under this approach, the limitations on the act of state doc-
trine contained in the bill would have applied to cases involving private
parties as well as cases involving foreign sovereigns.232 In foreign
branch expropriation cases, however, such an extension would be detri-
mental to the interests of United States banks with international bank-
ing activities.233 Additionally, such an extension of H.R. 3137 is proce-
durally impractical.
The restrictions on the act of state provisions of H.R. 3137 would
have applied only in expropriation cases brought pursuant to the
FSIA.23 4 Accordingly, the jurisdiction of a United States court to adju-
dicate expropriation cases under the FSIA is extremely limited.23 5 A
United States court can exercise jurisdiction over an expropriation
claim only if the claim involves rights in property taken in violation of
international law.236 Additionally, either the property or proceeds of the
property must be present in the United States in connection with the
commercial activities of the foreign sovereign, or an agency of the for-
eign state engaged in commercial activities in the United States must
own or operate the property. 237 These jurisdictional requirements
render impractical any attempt to expand the restrictions of H.R. 3137
to foreign branch expropriation cases between private parties.
Bank); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981)
(concerning an expropriated Saigon branch and New York main office of Chase Man-
hattan Bank), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp.
1526 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (involving Citibank, N.A. and Citibank Saigon).
231. FSIA Hearings, supra note 197, at 36 (statement of Elizabeth G. Verville,
Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State).
232. Id.
233. See supra notes 218-24 and accompanying text (discussing how the elimina-
tion of the act of state doctrine in foreign branch expropriation cases prejudices the
interests of United States banks).
234. H.R. 3137, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1985), reprinted in FSIA Hearings,
supra note 197, at 3; id. at 33 (statement of Elizabeth G. Verville, Acting Legal Ad-
viser, Department of State).
235. FSIA Hearings, supra note 197, at 103 (statement of Mark B. Feldman,
Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Revision of the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act, Section of International Law and Practice, American Bar Association).
236. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1982).
237. Id. Additionally, a United States court can exercise jurisdiction over an expro-
priation claim brought as a counterclaim in an action involving a foreign state. Id. §
1607.
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The confiscation of property in violation of international law is a
threshold requirement regarding the exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to
the FSIA.238 The precise nature of international law on expropriations
is unsettled." 9 United States courts, recognizing this uncertainty, are
reluctant to conclude that expropriation decrees of a foreign govern-
ment violate principles of international law.240 This judicial reluctance
effectively precludes a plaintiff from satisfying the threshold jurisdic-
tional requirement for the exercise of jurisdiction in expropriation
cases. Therefore, the jurisdictional requirements that the FSIA imposes
on all expropriation cases effectively nullifies any expansion of the act
of state restrictions contained in H.R. 3137.
V. PROPOSALS
Congress, perceiving inequities in many expropriation cases, has
designed legislation to prevent these inequitable results.2 1 Such legisla-
tion, however, has not achieved the ends Congress sought. 2  This sec-
tion discusses two possible solutions to the problem of applying the act
of state doctrine in foreign branch expropriation cases. The first, a very
broad solution, suggests judicial acceptance of a situs determination
test based entirely on conflict of laws principles.24 3 The second recom-
mends that Congress enact a statute applicable exclusively in foreign
branch appropriation cases to accompany legislative attempts to restrict
application of the act of state doctrine.
238. Id. § 1605(a)(3). After demonstrating a confiscation of property in violation
of international law, the party challenging the propriety or validity of the taking must
show contacts between the expropriated property and the United States. Id. Money is
an extremely fungible good, and when money is deposited in a bank it loses its indepen-
dent identity. 5A MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING § 114 (1983). Arguably, when the
deposits of an expropriated branch are commingled with the funds of the central bank
of the expropriating state, they too lose their independent identity. Consideration of
whether this fact precludes establishing this additional jurisdictional requirement is be-
yond the scope of this Comment.
239. See supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text (discussing international disa-
greement concerning the obligations of an expropriating state).
240. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text (discussing judicial reluctance
to label a nation a violator of international law).
241. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (discussing legislative at-
tempts to restrict or eliminate the act of state doctrine).
242. See supra note 195 (explaining judicial hostility to the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment); see also supra notes 200-24 and accompanying text (explaining the shortcom-
ings of the International Rule of Law Act of 1981); supra notes 228-40 and accompa-
nying text (showing the flaws in the proposed amendments to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976).
243. See infra notes 245-65 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict of laws
approach to situs determination).
244. See infra notes 268-84 and accompanying text (discussing a statutory ap-
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A. CONFLICT OF LAWS APPROACH TO SITus DETERMINATION
The act of state doctrine is a conflict of laws principle. 24 1 Because
situs determination tests are of paramount importance in determining
the applicability of the act of state doctrine in foreign branch expropri-
ation cases, 46 the situs determination test employed should reflect con-
flict of laws principles. This section outlines the strengths and weak-
nesses of a conflict of laws approach to situs determination.
The prevailing conflict of laws principle in contract cases247 is the
center of gravity doctrine. 48 In cases involving the interests of two or
more states, the doctrine requires the forum court to determine which
state has the most significant relationship to the subject matter of the
dispute.149 A court must consider the contacts between the subject mat-
ter of the dispute and the interested states to determine which state has
the most significant relationship with the dispute.2 10 Among the con-
proach to foreign branch expropriation cases).
245. Jimenez v. Aristequieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557 n.6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 914 (1962); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 855 (2d Cir.
1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); RESTATE IENT (SECOND) FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 41 comment c (Tent. Draft No. 7
(1986)).
246. Note, Fundamental Inquiry, supra note 20, at 124.
247. See Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 101 (1966) (holding that the
debtor-creditor relationship between a bank and its depositors is a contractual relation-
ship). The debtor-creditor relationship can be created through either an express or im-
plied contract. 9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking § 267(b) (1938).
248. See Fricke v. lsbrandtsen Co., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (stat-
ing that federal courts determine the center of gravity of a contract to determine the
governing substantive law of the contracts). Courts use the doctrine exclusively in con-
troversies concerning which state laws govern the contractual relationship at issue. See,
e.g., Fleet Messenger Serv., Inc., v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 315 F.2d 593, 596 (2d
Cir. 1963) (applying the center of gravity test, the court held that New York law, not
Pennsylvania law, governed an insurance contract); Strubbe v. Sonnenschein, 299 F.2d
185, 189 (2d Cir. 1962) (holding New Jersey law rather than New York law governed
the insurance contract); Richland Dev. Co. v. Staples, 295 F.2d 122, 127 (5th Cir.
1961) (applying Alabama law over Missouri law). The rationale for applying the test
in choice of law situations, however, supports use of the doctrine as a situs determina-
tion test for act of state purposes. See infra notes 258-64 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the applicability of the "center of gravity" test in act of state cases).
249. See supra note 248 (providing cases that used the center of gravity doctrine).
250. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 307 (3d ed. 1977); RESTATE.MENT
(SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAW § 188(2) (1969). The fifth circuit has gradually moved
toward the center of gravity concept in determining the situs of intangible property.
See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985) (considering sev-
eral contacts that the center of gravity doctrine considers significant). The situs deter-
mination test that the court in Callejo employed differs from the center of gravity test
because it does not require qualitative evaluation of the factors considered. See infra
notes 251-57 and accompanying text (explaining the qualitative evaluation of the fac-
tors examined under the center of gravity test).
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tacts courts consider are the place of contracting, 251 the place of negoti-
ation of the contract,2 52 the place of performance,151 and the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of
the parties. 54
The center of gravity test found in the Restatement (Second) Con-
flict of Laws is not a rigid, mechanical test that requires judges to add
up the contacts between the transaction and each interested state and
then rule that the state with the most contacts to the transaction has
the most significant relationship to the subject matter of the dispute.2"5
Rather, the test grants judges discretion to evaluate the relative impor-
tance of the contacts between the transaction in question and the inter-
ested states.25 The strength of this qualitative evaluation of the con-
251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (2)(a) (1969). The place
where the last act necessary to create a legal obligation occurs is the place where a
contract is made. 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 97 (3d ed. 1957). Although the place
of contracting is a significant factor in determining which state has the most significant
relationship to the subject of the litigation, it is not an all-important factor. R. LEFLAR,
supra note 250, at 297. In fact, in certain situations, the actual completion of the con-
tract will be a fortuitous and relatively insignificant event in the total contractual rela-
tionship between the parties. Cochran v. Ellsworth, 126 Cal. App. 2d 429, 437-38, 272
P.2d 904, 909 (1954). Because a bank assumes a legal obligation when it accepts a
deposit, the office at which the deposit is taken is the place of contracting. 1 W.
SCHLICHTING, supra note 8, § 9.02(1).
252. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2)(b) (1969). The state in
which protracted negotiations take place has an interest in overseeing the conduct of
negotiations and the contract resulting from such negotiations. Id. § 188 comment e.
253. Id. § 188(2)(c). The state in which performance is to occur has an interest in
ensuring that performance of contractual obligations does not jeopardize public health
or safety. Id. § 188 comment e. The place of performance becomes less significant
when "(1) at the time of contracting it is either uncertain or unknown, or when (2)
performance by a party is divided more or less equally among two or more states with
different local rules on the particular issue." Id. For conflict of laws purposes, when a
contract calls for performance in more than one state, the state in which the
nonperforming party realizes the benefits of the contract is the state of performance.
Graham v. Wilkins, 145 Conn. 34, 39-40, 138 A.2d 705, 708 (1958).
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2)(e) (1969). When a
party to the contract is a citizen or resident of a state, that state has an interest in
protecting the party. Id. § 188 comment e.
255. See id. § 188 (stating the "contacts are to be evaluated according to their
relative importance with respect to the particular issue"). But see Weintraub, Choice
of Law in Contract, 54 IOWA L. REv. 399, 413-14 (1968) (stating that despite the
Restatement provision concerning qualitative evaluation of the contacts considered,
judges resort to a direct counting of the physical contacts between the transaction and
each interested state). A court that merely counts the contacts between the subject
matter of the litigation and each interested state cannot determine which state has the
most significant relationship to the transaction at issue in the litigation. Id.
256. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969). The evaluation of
the contacts between the subject matter of the litigation and the interested states re-
quires consideration of the needs of the interstate and international systems, the rele-
vant policies of the forum, the relevant policies of the interested states, the protection
of justified expectations, the policies underlying the particular field of law, and the
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tacts between the subject matter of the dispute and each interested
state is that it allows a court to determine, in a particular factual set-
ting, which state is most intimately concerned with the subject matter
of the litigation.257
Although courts only employ the center of gravity test in a straight
choice of law context,258 the concepts underlying the test make it ide-
ally suited as a situs determination test in foreign branch expropriation
cases. Identifying and qualitatively evaluating the contacts between the
deposit contract and the interested foreign state would allow a United
States court to appreciate fully the expectations of the foreign state
regarding that contract. 259 A United States court that fully under-
stands those expectations of dominion over the disputed property is un-
likely to act in contravention of those expectations.260 Because the
center of gravity test avoids frustrating the expectations of dominion of
a foreign state over the deposit relationship, courts would be less likely
to interfere with the ability of the President to conduct foreign rela-
tions.261 Therefore, a center of gravity situs determination test is consis-
tent with the constitutional underpinnings of the act of state doctrine.
The center of gravity test, however, has one flaw that may make it
unsuitable for use as a situs determination test in foreign branch expro-
priation cases. Because the test provides judges with great flexibility in
evaluating the contacts between each interested state and the subject
matter of the litigation,6 2 the center of gravity test creates more uncer-
tainty and unpredictability than any of the three traditional situs deter-
nination tests.263 The determination of which state has the most signifi-
cant relationship to the confiscated deposits could become entirely a
subjective judicial evaluation of the contacts between the deposit con-
tract and each interested state.2U In such a situation, situs determina-
certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result. Id. § 6(2)(a)-(e).
257. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 161, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1954).
258. See supra note 248 (demonstrating that United States courts use the center of
gravity test exclusively in choice of laws contexts).
259. See supra note 80 (explaining the necessity of a United States court to fully
understand a foreign state's expectations concerning the subject matter of the
litigation).
260. See supra note 146-48 and accompanying text (explaining that a United
States court that fully appreciates the expectations of a foreign government is unlikely
to render a decision hostile to those expectations).
261. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (explaining when judicial consider-
ation of a claim will inhibit the ability of the President to conduct foreign relations).
262. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1969).
263. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 161, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1954) (stating the
outcome of the center of gravity test is not predictable).
264. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 250, at 310 (stating that an unformulated rule
exists whereby judges manipulate the center of gravity test to achieve just and moral
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tion and, therefore, the applicability of the act of state doctrine would
become a matter of judicial discretion. United States banks desire some
degree of certainty on the extent of their liability in the event of an
expropriation of the foreign branch. An act of state doctrine, which is
applicable exclusively upon a subjective determination of a judge, will
not facilitate the overseas expansion of United States banks. 20r In this
sense, a conflict of laws approach to situs determination would not be
an improvement over the current situs tests.
B. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO FOREIGN BRANCH BANK
EXPROPRIATIONS
Congressional attempts to alter or eliminate the act of state doctrine,
viewed in the context of foreign branch expropriation cases, are inher-
ently flawed and impractical. 6 Such attempts invariably prejudice the
interests of United States banks operating foreign branches.2 67 Any
Congressional restriction on the application of the act of state doctrine
must adequately protect the interests of United States banks with for-
eign branches. A federal statute accompanying congressional restric-
tions on the act of state doctrine, applicable exclusively in foreign
branch expropriation cases, would assure such protections. Congres-
sional adoption of a statute similar to section 138 of the New York
banking title268 would adequately protect the interests of both the
United States banks and their foreign depositors. 6 9 Such a statute
would provide a predictable solution, consistent with the constitutional
underpinnings of the act of state doctrine.
results); see also Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,
1959 DUKE L.J. 172, 175 (implying that sensitivity or receptiveness to a particular
claim affects the center of gravity analysis); Weintraub, supra note 255, at 413 (stating
that the center of gravity test can easily become a numerical test with a court holding
that the state with the most contacts to the subject of the litigation has the most signifi-
cant relationship).
265. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text (discussing how uncertainty
over the application of the act of state doctrine inhibits the international expansion of
United States banks).
266. See supra notes 202-24 and accompanying text (explaining the flaws in the
International Rule of Law Act of 1981); supra notes 228-38 (discussing the flaws in
the 1985 proposal to amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976).
267. See supra notes 218-24 and accompanying text (discussing how congressional
attempts to alter the act of state doctrine denies United States banks, innocent third
parties, an affirmative defense in foreign branch expropriation cases).
268. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 138 (McKinney 1971).
269. See Letter from J.S. Hutto, Superintendent and Counsel of the New York
Banking Department, to Herbert Lehman, Governor of New York (May 16, 1937),
cited in Heininger, supra note 49, at 989 (stating that section 138 would provide "addi-
tional protection to banks and trust companies having foreign branches, in the event
such branches are seized or nationalized by the government of such country").
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Section 138 allows courts to consider the extent of an expropriation
in determining the liability of a United States bank to the depositors of
its expropriated branch. 7 Section 138 is a two-part regulatory scheme.
The first subsection applies only when a foreign government expropri-
ates both the assets and liabilities of a foreign branch.27 1 The parent
bank then is liable to the same extent as any local banking corpora-
tion. 72 Subsection two applies only when a "dominant authority which
is not recognized by the United States as the de jure government of the
foreign territory concerned"2 73 expropriates only the assets of the
branch.2 74 Where an unrecognized authority confiscates only the assets
of the branch, the liability of the parent bank is reduced "pro lanto by
the proportion that the value. . . of such assets bears to the aggregate
of all deposits and contract liabilities of the branch. 275
In addition to resolving some of the fairness issues involved in foreign
branch expropriation cases, federal codification of section 138 would be
consistent with the principles underlying the act of state doctrine."' A
section 138 analysis is unlikely to frustrate the expectations of the for-
eign government concerning the expropriated deposits. For example,
when a foreign government, whether recognized or not, confiscates both
the assets and liabilities of the branch, courts would determine the lia-
bility of the parent bank in accordance with the laws of the foreign
state.2 77 Application of this foreign law would be a judicial recognition
that the foreign state has the greatest interest in the banking relation-
ship.2 78 Therefore, the United States court would endorse, rather than
270. Comment, Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank: Bank Liability for For-
eign Branch Seizures, 2 ANN. REP. BANKING L. 393, 404-05 (1983).
271. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 138(1) (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1988).
272. Id. The laws of the expropriating country include "all acts, decrees, regula-
tions and orders promulgated or enforced by a dominant authority asserting govern-
mental, military or police power of any kind at the place where any such branch office
is located, whether or not such dominant authority be recognized as a de facto or de
jure government." Id.
273. Id. § 138(2).
274. Id.
275. Id. Where an unrecognized government confiscates only the assets of a
branch, section 138(2) reduces the liability of the parent bank according to the follow-
ing formula:
Depositor's Account Balance X (Branch Assets Lost - Prcconfiscation Liabilities)
Comment, Foreign Branches, supra note 35, at 406. Banks determine the value of the
assets lost and the aggregate preconfiscation liabilities of the branch by examining the
books and records of the branch at the time of the expropriation. N.Y. BANKING LAw
§ 138(2) (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1988).
276. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text (discussing the underpinnings
of the act of state doctrine).
277. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 138(1) (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1988).
278. Fricke v. lsbrandtsen Co., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Fed-
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frustrate, the expectations of the foreign state concerning the banking
relationship. This endorsement of the expectations of the foreign state
would not impair the ability of the President to conduct foreign
relations.
Similarly, when an unrecognized foreign government confiscates only
the assets of a foreign branch, determining the liability of the parent
bank will not frustrate the expectations of the foreign state concerning
dominion over the banking relationship. A United States court would
accept the validity of the confiscation and examine the books and
records of the branch to establish the extent of the parent bank's liabil-
ity. 79 The validation of the confiscation would be an endorsement of
the expectations of dominion of the foreign state over the banking rela-
tionship and would not inhibit the President in the conduct of foreign
relations.
In foreign branch expropriation cases, section 138 requires a case by
case appraisal of the extent of an expropriation.2 80 Even though this
statute reduces the possibility of unfair results in foreign branch expro-
priation cases, it is not a problem free solution. Initially, a court must
decide which of the two subsections applies. This determination re-
quires a thorough evaluation of the expropriation decrees of the foreign
state.2"' Most expropriation decrees, however, do not unequivocally in-
dicate the scope of the expropriation.282 Where an expropriation decree
is ambiguous, a United States court would have few objective guide-
lines for determining which subsection applies.
Federal codification of section 138 would bring predictability to in-
ternational banking and would adequately safeguard the interests of
United States banks operating foreign branches. 8 3 United States banks
operating branches abroad would no longer have to guess whether a
United States court would apply the act of state doctrine to relieve
them of liability for the debts of an expropriated branch. A United
States bank would be liable only for the amount of nonexpropriated
eral courts apply the laws of the state that they believe has the greatest interest in the
subject matter of the litigation. Id.
279. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 138(2) (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1988).
280. Comment, Foreign Branches, supra note 35, at 405.
281. See supra note 271-72 and accompanying text (explaining that section 138(1)
applies to cases in which the foreign government expropriates both the assets and liabil-
ities of the foreign branch); supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text (explaining
that section 138(2) applies only to cases in which an unrecognized government confis-
cates only the assets of a foreign branch).
282. See supra notes 65-66 (discussing the ambiguous nature of expropriation
decrees).
283. See supra note 269 and accompanying text (explaining the confusion that the
proposed statute will eliminate).
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assets it was allowed to maintain in the foreign county.' Because it
would allow a consistent to approach international banking, federal
codification of section 138 would facilitate overseas expansion of
United States banks.
CONCLUSION
The traditional situs determination tests for the act of state doctrine
do not provide a precise measurement of a foreign government's expec-
tations regarding property at issue before United States courts. A situs
determination test reflecting conflict of laws principles would remedy
this situation. The lack of certainty and predictability inherent in such
a situs test, however, may render it unworkable in foreign branch ex-
propriation cases. Additionally, the traditional inability of the United
States courts to agree on a single test supports the abandonment of
situs determination in foreign branch expropriation cases. Federal codi-
fication of section 138 of the New York banking code would provide a
viable alternative to the act of state doctrine in foreign branch expro-
priation cases.
284. N.Y. Banking Law § 133(2) (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1988).
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